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STANDING ON A SPECTRUM: THIRD PARTY STANDING IN THE 
UNITED STATES, CANADA, AND AUSTRALIA 
Gwendolyn McKee1 
Comparative analysis shows that the more a legal regime embraces 
rights, the more that regime must create exceptions to the          
traditional standing requirements in order to allow third party 
standing.  Looking at the United States, Canada, and Australia,  
only Australia has completely retained the traditional prohibition 
on third party standing.  Australia is also the only one of the three 
countries without a written guarantee of rights.  However, while 
the United States and Canada have both expanded standing in    
order to better protect rights, they have done so in different ways.  
The United States has adopted a piecemeal approach, creating  
specific third party exceptions to address problems with particular 
rights, while Canada has covered these areas and more with a   
single broad exception, public interest standing.  The Canadian  
approach offers much greater predictability and stability.           
Applying a single test to all third party cases allows broader and 
more coherent development of the case law because the law is 
formed from a single much larger body of cases.  It also prevents 
standing on particular issues from undergoing dramatic changes 
every time the judicial makeup of the Court changes.  The United 
States should replace the current system of exceptions to the  
standing requirements with a universal exception styled after    
Canadian public interest standing.  Doing so would ensure that the 
rights protections already present in American standing are         
retained and allow coherent future evolution of the field. 
INTRODUCTION 
Standing, one of the basic justiciability requirements a plaintiff must         
demonstrate to bring a lawsuit in the United States, acts as a gateway to the    
courthouse.  Many common law countries have similar standing requirements.2  
These requirements are designed to do one thing:  determine whether the plaintiff 
 ________________________  
 1. LL.M., Yale Law School 2010; J.D., American University 2007; B.A., Dartmouth College 2003.  I 
would like to thank Professors Stone Sweet and Noah Messing for comments on earlier drafts. 
 2. Stephen J. Wallace, Why Third-Party Standing in Abortion Suits Deserves a Closer Look, 84 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1369, 1375-76 (2009).  While standing has been traced by at least one commentator to the      
introduction of liberal pleading standards in the United States, it is a basic requirement to bring a lawsuit not only 
in the United States, but other common law countries as well.  Id. 
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bringing a suit can demonstrate a sufficient personal interest in the matter.  The 
reasons suggested for this requirement include preventing vexatious lawsuits and 
ensuring that cases are brought by only those people with the greatest interest in the 
matter.  In the vast majority of cases, identical results will be reached in all     
countries.  Differences begin to appear when a plaintiff brings suit claiming a   
violation not of the plaintiff’s own rights, but the rights of a party who is not before 
the court.  Such cases require an exception to the traditional standing requirements, 
and are referred to as third party standing cases. 
This article examines third party standing cases in the United States, Canada, 
and Australia.  It demonstrates that third party standing can only be understood 
with reference to the role of modern courts in broad-based, constitutional style 
rights protection.  This type of protection has been the main factor driving courts to 
create exceptions to the traditional standing requirements.  It is only once these 
exceptions have been established that a court begins to consider allowing third  
party standing in cases that do not involve rights.  The effects of this theory can be 
seen in the three countries examined in this article. 
Canada developed a coherent and unified third party exception in rights cases 
for public interest standing.  This broad public interest standing was then applied to 
cases that did not involve rights, such as administrative cases.  This, in turn, led to 
the robust environmental standing now seen in Canada.  In the United States,   
however, rights protection efforts by the Supreme Court have led to the creation of 
a number of different standing exceptions.  In contrast to the general exception 
created in Canada, the standing exceptions in the United States have been kept very 
specific and strictly limited to their corresponding rights.  Likely for this reason, 
third party standing is not allowed in cases that do not implicate rights, such as 
cases brought to protect the environment.  Association standing, which exists only 
in the United States, can be explained as an attempt to compensate for the lack of a 
coherent third party standing doctrine in many of these cases, and is another way 
that standing law in the U.S. has been fragmented.  Finally, Australia, where the 
lack of a written bill of rights has resulted in limited rights protection and          
accompanying limited case law, has not yet faced the types of rights cases that led 
courts in Canada and the United States to expand standing.  The Australian High 
Court has also been reluctant to expand standing in administrative cases, such as 
environmental cases, despite calls to adopt Canadian style public interest standing.  
This result can be explained by the lack of rights-driven standing exceptions in 
Australian law.  Australia and Canada therefore represent opposite ends of the 
standing spectrum. 
In a third party standing case, the plaintiff may be attempting to bring the suit 
on behalf of a known party who would be able to demonstrate the requisite interest 
in court but who is unable or unwilling to bring the suit, or the suit may be brought 
on behalf of one or more unknown parties who have been or may be injured by the 
actions of the defendant. As Shapiro and Stone Sweet have noted, third party  
standing to protect the rights of unknown plaintiffs generally presents a form of 
2
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abstract review, a type of review that courts in common law countries are          
traditionally uncomfortable allowing.3  It is possible that the greater willingness to 
create a unified third party standing doctrine in Canada has also been driven by a 
greater willingness to acknowledge and embrace the role abstract review plays in 
rights determinations. 
In Part I, this article begins by describing the basis for standing in the three 
countries studied.  In Part II, it looks at standing in rights cases, both at the        
different ways the U.S. and Canada have adapted standing to allow broader rights 
protection and at the lack of similar cases in Australia.  In Part III, it examines 
some of the repercussions of the methods chosen, including expanded               
administrative standing in Canada, more robust association standing in the United 
States, and little third party standing at all in Australia.  The article concludes by 
discussing the differences in approach among the three countries examined, and 
urges that the United States and Australia acknowledge the changing role of courts 
in modern society and accept broader standing criteria.   
I.   THE BASIS OF STANDING IN THE UNITED STATES, CANADA, AND 
AUSTRALIA 
Standing, a basic element of common law jurisprudence, has been traced to 
“the posture traditionally required of advocates.”4  However, despite the prevalence 
of the concept in a variety of common law countries, the three countries examined 
in this article derive their standing requirements from different legal authority.  The 
United States and Australia both now claim a constitutional origin for the          
requirement.  Canada, in contrast, views the matter as falling entirely within the 
control of the courts, subject only to a duty to ensure citizens are able to protect 
their rights, and has relied on its Constitution to expand standing rather than to 
restrict it.  Canada is also the only one of the three countries in which a court will 
allow standing based solely on the public interest. 
A. The Basis of Standing in the United States 
The United States Constitution grants federal courts jurisdiction over “[c]ases” 
and “[c]ontroversies.”5  These vague words have led to the creation of a number of 
baseline requirements that must be met before a case is considered justiciable and 
allowed to proceed.  These justiciability factors include: standing, mootness,    
ripeness, and the political question doctrine.6  This article focuses exclusively on 
standing and, more specifically, on the small subgroup of third party standing. 
 ________________________  
 3. MARTIN SHAPIRO & ALEC STONE SWEET, ON LAW, POLITICS, AND JUDICIALIZATION 352 (2002). 
 4. N. Australian Aboriginal Legal Aid Service Inc. v. Bradley, (2001) 192 A.L.R. 625 (Austl.) (citing 
Truth About Motorways Pty Ltd v. Macquarie Infrastructure Investment Management Ltd, (2000) 200 C.L.R. 591 
(Austl.)). 
 5. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 6. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006). 
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As the Supreme Court has interpreted the case or controversy provision of the 
U.S. Constitution, standing requires injury, causation, and redressability.7  These 
three consolidated requirements were set forth in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.8  
The Defenders of Wildlife Court required that injury be both (a) “concrete and  
particularized” and (b) “actual or imminent.”9  The injury analysis therefore has 
both a substantive and temporal component.  Substantively, a concrete and        
particularized injury is an injury that affects the plaintiff in a “personal and       
individual way.”10  While cases have not established that the plaintiff must be the 
only person to suffer injury, the injury at issue must be distinguishable from that 
suffered by the general public.11  Temporally, the court must be satisfied that the 
plaintiff is facing a real and immediate threat, rather than attempting to prevent a 
future hypothetical harm.12  Causation requires a showing that the injury has been 
directly caused by the person or entity sued, rather than a party that is not before 
the court.13  Finally, redressability requires a sufficient level of certainty that a 
court decision in favor of the plaintiff will remedy the injury.14 
Standing in the United States is, however, not limited solely by the             
Constitution.  In addition to the constitutional requirements, the Court has also 
placed prudential limitations on standing.15  One of these prudential bars, which is 
the focus of this article, is a general prohibition against third party standing.16  In a 
third party standing case, the plaintiff is seeking to raise issues related to an injury 
suffered by someone else, whether real or imaginary.17  The court must then decide 
whether to allow the plaintiff to make arguments on behalf of the injured party.  
Generally, such arguments are not allowed. 
However, with every rule comes exceptions.  This article examines a number 
of the exceptions used in the United States to circumvent the prohibition on third 
party standing.  Unlike Canada, which has generally accepted broader standing in 
rights cases brought in the public interest, the United States has only created     
exceptions for particular rights.  Fallon has noted that many third party cases  
 ________________________  
 7. Sprint Communs. Co., L.P. v. APCC Servs., 554 U.S. 269, 273  (2008). 
 8. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).   
 9. Id. at 560. 
 10. Id. at 560 n.1. 
 11. The requirement that the plaintiff can truly be considered to have suffered a particularized injury is 
questionable in certain third party standing exceptions, particularly in taxpayer standing. 
 12. Id. at 560.   
 13. Causation was not demonstrated in Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984).  Black parents sued the IRS 
claiming that tax deductions used by racially discriminatory schools prevented their children from being educated 
in an integrated environment.  Id. at 739-40.  The Court held that a chain of causation that traced through white 
parents deciding to send their children to segregated schools to the discriminatory schools that took advantage of 
the exemption and back to a government agency was too far attenuated.  Id. at 757-58. 
 14. The plaintiffs in Allen v. Wright also failed to demonstrate redressability, because it was not clear that 
even if the tax exemption was at stake the private schools would admit black students, or that if the school gave up 
the tax exemption and were forced to raise tuition, white parents would choose to send their children to public 
school rather than pay the increased fee.  Id. at 758. 
 15. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 804 (1985). 
 16. Id.  
 17. Gladstone, Realtors v. Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99-100 (1979). 
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merely reflect the evolution of the law on a “doctrine-by-doctrine basis.”18      
However, Fallon also considers the idea that such tests implicate third party    
standing to be question-begging.19  In this, Fallon is wrong.  While third party 
standing in many rights cases has emerged independently, it has been driven by a 
broader purpose - the need to protect rights.  Fallon is correct, however, that the 
distinct and limited basis of each exception has ensured that these exceptions    
remain firmly constrained within the limited areas chosen by the Court. 
B. The Basis of Standing in Canada 
Canada, unlike the U.S., does not derive its standing limitations from direct 
constitutional language. Canada’s standing jurisprudence is instead entirely    
common law-based, although it can be specifically restricted by statute. The     
Canadian Constitution has played a central role in pushing the evolution of third 
party standing, but it has had the opposite effect seen in the United States. Unlike 
the U.S., where the Constitution forms the first limitation of the standing           
requirement, the Constitution in Canada has been the basis for expanding standing.  
As described in Part II.B infra, in a trilogy of cases beginning in the pre-
constitutional era, the Supreme Court of Canada expanded the notion of who could 
properly come before a court to allow public interest standing in rights cases.20  
The doctrine was later expanded to include administrative challenges through   
direct reference to the Constitution.21  The broad range of public interest standing 
has simplified the case law, at least when compared to the United States, as in most 
cases, the party either has direct standing or has public interest standing.  The all 
encompassing nature of public interest standing in Canada has, however, resulted 
in relatively poorly developed case law on association standing.  
C.  The Basis of Standing in Australia 
Like the United States, Australia also derives its standing requirement from 
constitutional text.  In Australia, standing is limited by the constitutional constraint 
that the court consider only “matters.”22  Initially, the term matters seems similar to 
the cases or controversies that United States courts are limited to.23  However, the 
Australian Law Reform Commission has said that matters, as used in the          
Australian Constitution, is not equivalent to the case or controversy restriction in 
the United States Constitution, stating “[t]he term ‘matters’ was chosen as the 
broadest available, by the drafters of the Constitution, who in other respects drew 
heavily on the language of Article III.”24  Likely for this reason, the term appears to 
 ________________________  
 18. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113 HARV. L. 
REV. 1321, 1327 (2000). 
 19. Id. at 1348. 
 20. Canadian Council of Churches v. R., [1992] 1 S.C.R. 236 (Can.). 
 21. Finlay v. Canada (Minister of Finance), [1986] 2 S.C.R. 607(Can.). 
 22. Australian Constitution §§ 75-77. 
 23. Australian Constitution §§ 75-77. 
 24. AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION, STANDING IN PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION 40 (1985). 
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be less important in Australia than the United States, and Australian standing cases 
generally rely more on the common law of standing.  The Australian Law Reform 
Commission has called for broad standing reforms in the country, including a   
presumption of standing in suits brought to vindicate a public interest, defined in 
terms of the remedy sought rather than the purpose of the claim.25  However, these 
recommendations have not yet resulted in changes to Australian standing law on a 
national level in third party standing cases.  One reason for this is likely the     
comparative lack of rights protecting cases, which has prevented the Australian 
High Court from being forced to expand standing to ensure the protection of rights. 
II. THIRD PARTY STANDING EXCEPTIONS TO VINDICATE RIGHTS 
Much of the expansion in standing law that has occurred in the last few       
decades has been due to courts opening the door to allow challenges brought to 
protect rights.26  Australia, lacking a written bill of rights, has faced little of this 
type of pressure in rights cases, and has therefore retained the traditional standing 
requirements.  In contrast, both the United States and Canada, countries in which 
the courts are charged with making final rights determinations,27 have witnessed an 
expansion in their respective standing doctrines.  However, while both countries 
have expanded standing, they have done so in very different ways.  In the United 
States, this expansion has occurred through the invention of a number of different 
exceptions to traditional standing, each created to vindicate particular rights.    
Taxpayer standing, for instance, has evolved as a particular response to the      
problems presented by the Establishment Clause, while the complete removal of 
the standing requirement in overbreadth cases has expanded the number of       
challenges that can be brought based on free speech and abortion rights.  Canada, 
in contrast, has approached standing in rights cases in a more coherent and     
transparent manner, allowing public interest standing when necessary in any case 
to protect rights. These differences are elaborated in this section, while the        
implications of these differences are addressed in the next section. 
A. Rights-Based Challenges in the United States 
The United States Supreme Court has created multiple exceptions to the      
traditional standing requirements in order to vindicate rights.  However, these have 
evolved on an issue by issue basis, and the Supreme Court has shown little interest 
in developing a more unified approach.  This section, like United States standing 
doctrine itself, is organized according to the specific right at issue.  The first part of 
this section addresses civil challenges to rights and includes taxpayer standing for 
 ________________________  
 25. AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION, BEYOND THE DOOR-KEEPER: STANDING TO SUE FOR PUBLIC 
REMEDIES §§ 1.14-1.16 (1996), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/alrc/publications/reports/78/ 
ALRC78.html.  The Australian Law Reform Commission had previously called this concept “an open door, but 
with a pest screen.”  AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION, STANDING IN PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION xii 
(1985). 
 26. As rights have been conceptualized in the United States.   
 27. The notwithstanding clause in Canada excepted. 
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Establishment Clause violations, overbreadth in free speech and abortion cases, and 
the general restriction on all other rights challenges in United States v. Salerno.28  
The second part of this section addresses standing in response to a criminal charge 
or conviction.  In contrast to Canada, where a criminal defendant is granted broad 
standing to challenge the statute under which the person was convicted, in the 
United States, the defendant remains bound by the same standing requirements that 
apply in all cases and is merely granted the privilege of bringing the challenge after 
having been charged.  The difference in the United States is therefore one of     
timing, not degree.  This extreme criminal constraint is a consequence of the way 
in which standing and remedy have become intertwined in overbreadth cases and 
through the restrictions placed on other facial challenges in Salerno. Salerno    
reinforces the inability of American courts to acknowledge the role of abstract  
review in modern rights cases. 
1. Vindication of Rights in the Civil Context in the United States 
a. Taxpayer Standing and Establishment Clause Violations 
Taxpayer standing is an example of a particular exception to traditional    
standing in that it is applicable only in limited circumstances and was created to 
protect a particular right.  It has been so narrowly defined that it is restricted to the 
narrow Establishment Clause challenge at issue in Flast v. Cohen in 1968.29 
In Flast, the appellants (plaintiffs below), all of whom claimed their status as 
federal taxpayers as the basis for the complaint, challenged a federal act granting 
money to religious schools to help finance instruction in secular subjects such as 
reading and math.30  The appellants contended that the agency implementing the 
act violated the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses because the money     
directed toward religious institutions was in effect “compulsory taxation for      
religious purposes.”31 
In granting standing, the Court overturned a prior decision prohibiting federal 
taxpayer suits, but did so under the condition that the taxpayer meet two separate 
requirements.  First, the taxpayer was required to establish a connection between 
the payment of taxes and the challenged legislative act, meaning that the challenge 
had to fall “under the taxing and spending clause of Art. I, § 8, of the                
Constitution.”32  This restriction meant that “[i]t will not be sufficient to allege an 
incidental expenditure of tax funds in the administration of an essentially          
regulatory statute.”33  Second, the taxpayer had to demonstrate that Congress had 
 ________________________  
 28. 481 U.S. 739 (1987). 
 29. 392 U.S. 83 (1968). 
 30. Id. at 85-86.  Specifically, in order to be eligible for this funding, which was aimed at assisting in the 
education of underprivileged schoolchildren, an institution was required to submit an education plan to a state 
agency for approval.   Id. at 86.  Approval was conditioned on the plan’s compliance with criteria established by 
the federal education secretary.  Id.  
 31. Id. at 87. 
 32. Id. at 102.   
 33. Id.  
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gone beyond a specific constitutional prohibition, not merely that the congressional 
action was beyond the tax and spend power.34 
This test, when first set forth, appeared to grant standing to any taxpayer        
alleging both a violation of the Taxing and Spending Clause and a violation of 
another constitutional right.  However, restrictions have been continually placed on 
the original requirements, most recently in the 2007 case, Hein v. Freedom from 
Religion Found., Inc.,35 narrowing the exception to direct Establishment Clause 
challenges only. 
Hein was the product of a split Court.  Justices Scalia and Thomas favored a 
complete overthrow of Flast.36  The controlling opinion, however, which was   
authored by Justice Alito, merely constrained Flast to its original facts.  Hein was 
brought as a challenge to the creation of “the White House Office of Faith-Based 
and Community Initiatives,” which was tasked with “eliminating unnecessary   
bureaucratic, legislative, and regulatory barriers that could impede [religious]   
organizations’ effectiveness and ability to compete equally for federal assistance,” 
as well as other executive branch organizations charged with ensuring that        
religious groups were able to compete for federal dollars.37  The critical fact was 
that all challenged organizations and policies were entirely executive branch   
products.38  No congressional dollars had been earmarked for either the goals or the 
organizations themselves.39 
The Court held that the respondents had failed to show standing, as the action 
they challenged was not a congressional appropriation, as Flast had required, but 
rather a decision lying entirely within the executive branch.40  In so holding, the 
Court noted that Flast had become confined to its facts, applicable only in        
challenges to congressional spending under the Establishment Clause.41 
Hein, therefore, merely solidified what had been generally understood to that 
point, that taxpayer standing was only available to challenge congressional       
expenditures alleged to be in violation of the Establishment Clause. An             
Establishment Clause exception is necessary because the nature of the               
Establishment Clause means that violations are usually too general to meet the  
necessary test for standing.  In contrast to the Free Speech Clause, which prohibits 
the government from interfering with an individual’s expression, or the Free     
Exercise Clause, which again prohibits the government from interfering with the 
activities of an individual, the Establishment Clause prohibits the government from 
 ________________________  
 34. Id. at 103.  Holding that the appellants had satisfied both conditions, the Court held they should be 
granted standing.  Id.  
 35. 551 U.S. 587 (2007). 
 36. Id. at 618. 
 37. Id. at 593-94. 
 38. Id. at 595. 
 39. Id.  Taxpayers and an organization representing the taxpayers brought suit claiming that the          
government had violated the Establishment Clause through conferences put on by the organizations.  Id.  These 
conferences allegedly singled out religious organizations as favored members of the political community, showed 
members of religious communities that they were favored insiders in the political community, and made clear to 
nonbelievers that they were not favored members of the political community.  Id. at 595-96. 
 40. Id. at 608-09. 
 41. Id. at 609. 
8
Barry Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 4
https://lawpublications.barry.edu/barrylrev/vol16/iss1/4
Spring 2011 Third Party Standing 123 
 
granting a benefit to a particular group.  In such a transaction, neither of the two 
parties involved, the government and the religious group, have any reason to     
contest the action.  Instead, the harm is felt by people who are not parties to the 
contract, and are therefore not quantifiably different than the rest of the population 
in the way that traditional standing has long demanded.  In short, the nature of the 
right demands a particular exception if the right is to be enforced.  Taxpayer   
standing provides a direct contradiction of the alleged constitutional requirement 
that a plaintiff must suffer an individual injury.  The Court acknowledges that there 
is no way to demonstrate this type of injury in an Establishment Clause case. 
The diffuse harm suffered in Establishment Clause challenges is very similar to 
the diffuse harm suffered in many environmental cases.  However, because       
taxpayer standing has been so closely tied to Establishment Clause challenges,  
rather than created as a more general exception for cases that would otherwise  
never be possible to bring, no extension of the doctrine is allowed.  Fear of abstract 
review cannot be used as an explanation for the tight restriction on taxpayer   
standing, as many taxpayer standing cases challenge specific action, and the     
alleged violation caused by that action can be analyzed under the applicable law.  
(Taxpayer standing could, however, also be used in a more traditional abstract 
manner.)  Taxpayer standing is therefore an example of a right-based exception 
allowed in concrete circumstances to correct a diffuse wrong.  Overbreadth, in  
contrast, is an exception allowing an abstract challenge to correct a (hypothetical) 
individual wrong. 
b. Overbreadth Challenges in the United States 
Standing in rights protecting cases cannot be understood in the United States 
without an overbreadth examination.  Overbreadth challenges allow the court to 
protect a particularly vulnerable or favored part of the population by allowing   
others to bring claims on their behalf.  Overbreadth is essentially an implicit     
acknowledgement that the traditional adversarial system is insufficient to protect 
certain rights for certain people. 
In an overbreadth challenge, the plaintiff claims to be protecting the rights of a 
particular group with a highly stylized injury, a form of abstract review.  Whether 
overbreadth will be allowed in a particular context therefore depends on whether 
the court believes that the injury of the fictional party is sufficiently stylized to 
allow a general determination without facts, and that the right is important enough 
to subvert traditional standing rules.  Overbreadth is well established in the free 
speech context and is also used in the abortion context, although support there has 
wavered.  These are the two areas in which it has been traditionally and most    
consistently applied. 
9
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c. Overbreadth and Abortion in the United States 
Overbreadth has been used in abortion cases since Roe v. Wade.42  In abortion 
cases, the protected groups have included minor girls afraid to speak to their     
parents and married women in abusive relationships with their husbands.  It is not 
difficult to construct prototypical narratives for these groups. 
In Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood, abortion providers challenged a New   
Hampshire law that required pregnant minors to undergo a two day wait while a 
parent was notified that an abortion would be performed, unless the minor opted 
for a judicial bypass.43  While the judicial bypass option guaranteed access to the 
courts twenty-four hours a day and seven days a week, both the trial and appellate 
court were granted a week to rule on the application.44  An explicit exception was 
granted for the life, but not the health, of the mother.45  New Hampshire did not 
contest that abortion statutes were required to create exceptions to preserve both 
the health and life of the mother.46  The question was not whether the case could be 
heard at all (the third party standing of the abortion providers was never           
questioned), but whether the court of appeals had properly vacated the entire     
statute.47 
Ayotte demonstrates the power of third party standing in overbreadth cases.  
Abortion providers were able to bring a challenge to protect the rights of a teenager 
facing a pregnancy that threatened her health. While Ayotte would likely be viewed 
as unsuccessful by those looking to apply overbreadth in a substantive manner, 
since the statute was not invalidated entirely, it demonstrates how effectively  
overbreadth functions as an alternative method of allowing third party standing.  
No pregnant teen from New Hampshire with a health condition was involved in the 
case, despite the fact that the case revolved around exactly this type of fictional 
plaintiff.  Nor is Ayotte the only case demonstrating the importance of third party 
standing to an understanding of overbreadth. 
In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Court invalidated a portion of a        
Pennsylvania law that forbade a married woman from undergoing an abortion 
without the consent of her husband.48  Casey, like Ayotte, was brought exclusively 
by abortion providers.49  The Casey Court also went further than the Ayotte Court 
substantively, and struck down the offending provision in its entirety.50  This result 
was reached without a single woman coming before a court to explain why she 
 ________________________  
 42. Ada v. Guam Soc’y of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 506 U.S. 1011, U.S. LEXIS 7350 at *2-3   
(Scalia, J., dissenting from a denial of a petition for certiorari). 
 43. 546 U.S. 320, 323-24 (2006).  Other exceptions were allowed if death were imminent or if a parent 
certified that he or she was already aware of the impending abortion.  Id. at 324.   
 44. Id.  
 45. Id.  
 46. Id. at 328.  The question, therefore, was merely one of remedy.  Id.  
 47. Id. at 332.  The Court in the end sent the case back to the court of appeals to determine whether the 
statute should be struck down entirely or merely enjoined from being enforced in an unconstitutional manner.  Id.  
 48. 505 U.S. 833, 898 (1992).  The law provided only limited exceptions.  Id.  
 49. Id. at 845. 
 50. Id. at 898 (bidding an end to the days when married women were considered the property of their 
husbands). 
10
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should not be required to notify her husband before undergoing an abortion.  The 
important facts about women in abusive relationships were inferred through expert 
testimony rather than personal experience.51  In this case, the overbreadth doctrine 
was successful not only in getting the third person standing case heard, but in  
striking down the offending portion of the statute to protect the rights of a         
particular and vulnerable population. 
Nor does it appear that the use of overbreadth in abortion cases is likely to go 
away any time soon, despite calls by some commentators that Gonzales v. Carhart 
has signaled to the contrary.52  The Gonzales Court refused to invalidate the      
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, holding that there was insufficient        
evidence that the procedure outlawed by the Act would affect the health of the 
mother.53  The Court’s admonition that the case should have been handled in an as 
applied manner is better understood as a limited conclusion that no need for a 
health exception had been established in that particular case rather than as a     
complete retreat from all facial challenges to abortion statutes.54 
Overbreadth involves an important interplay between the right and the fictional 
plaintiff seeking protection for that right.  What abortion cases have really shown 
about overbreadth is not that it is no longer allowed, but that it is allowed when the 
fictional plaintiffs are particularly vulnerable members of the population.  Under 
this reasoning, the fictional plaintiff in Gonzales, a woman facing a health crisis 
necessitating an abortion through the banned procedure, was therefore not         
sufficiently helpless, given the alternative abortion options available.55  In contrast, 
the abused wives in Casey and the pregnant minors in Ayotte were more          
compelling fictional plaintiffs. A minor in Ayotte facing a threat to her health 
seemed both more plausible and of greater concern than the grown woman facing a 
threat to her health in Gonzales. 
d. Overbreadth and Free Speech in the United States 
A fictional plaintiff in a free speech case undergoes far less scrutiny than one 
in an abortion case.56  Even more so than the right to an abortion, the right to free 
 ________________________  
 51. Id. at 890.  The facts included “[a] woman in a shelter or a safe house unknown to her husband is not 
‘reasonably likely’ to have bodily harm inflicted upon her by her batterer, however her attempt to notify her  
husband pursuant to section 3209 could accidentally disclose her whereabouts to her husband.  Her fear of future 
ramifications would be realistic under the circumstances” and “[i]t is common for battered women to have sexual 
intercourse with their husbands to avoid being battered.  While this type of coercive sexual activity would be 
spousal sexual assault as defined by the Act, many women may not consider it to be so and others would fear 
disbelief.”  Id. 
 52. 550 U.S. 124, 168 (2007). 
 53. Id. at 166-67 (“The Act is not invalid on its face where there is uncertainty over whether the barred 
procedure is ever necessary to preserve a woman’s health, given the availability of other abortion procedures that 
are considered to be safe alternatives.”). 
 54. Id. at 154-156. The Court was similarly unconvinced that the behavior prohibited by the act would be 
confused with legal alternative means of abortion, thereby making the act overbroad by applying it to procedures 
not intended to be criminalized. Id.  
 55. It is easier to create a fictional plaintiff in a free speech case than in an abortion case. 
 56. Hypothetical plaintiffs played a central role in Reno v. ACLU.  521 U.S. 844 (1997).  In Reno, free 
speech groups challenged the Communications Decency Act of 1996 claiming that the Act was overbroad.  Id. at 
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speech is viewed as so critical, and yet at the same time so fragile, that all members 
of society are called forth to protect it providing a great deal of leeway for fictional 
plaintiffs.57  With logic like this, the Supreme Court has admitted that the right to 
free speech cannot be adequately protected under the traditional standing      
framework.  However, overbreadth itself still retains a limited scope when carried 
over to criminal cases. 
2. Standing in Criminal Cases in the United States  
Both the United States and Canada allow a criminal defendant to challenge the 
constitutionality of the law under which he has been charged.  However, this right 
is far more limited in the United States than in Canada, and far more limited than 
many American commentators currently believe.  In Canada, a defendant is granted 
a broader right to challenge legislation on behalf of a third party if the challenge 
occurs in connection with a criminal case than would be allowed in an unrelated 
civil case.  The United States does not grant criminals this same broad protection.  
A criminal seeking to challenge a law must meet the same third party standing test 
that would be required in a civil context.  Leniency in the United States merely 
means allowing the criminal to challenge the law under which he has been charged 
in a separate case or as a defense. The United States therefore only allows the  
challenge to take place at a different time, whereas Canada differs not merely in 
time but in scope, allowing a broader range of challenges than would otherwise be 
allowed in a traditional civil case. 
Many American commentators take it as a given that a defendant has standing 
to challenge the constitutionality of the law under which the defendant was       
convicted.  While this is certainly true when the defendant is alleging that the   
statute violated a personal right of the defendant, such as in Lawrence v. Texas,58 it 
is greatly diminished when the defendant is asserting the rights of other people. 
In the United States, a defendant is restricted to the same types of claims that 
could be brought as facial challenges in civil suits.  This restriction was cemented 
in United States v. Salerno.59  While Salerno dealt with the merits of the case, it is 
also important for third party standing because the connection between overbreadth 
and standing means the case also severely restricts the available arguments for a 
criminal defendant. After Salerno, a criminal defendant raising a third party   
standing defense that does not rely on overbreadth in the First Amendment or  
  
862 nn. 27-28.  In reaching a conclusion that the Act improperly prohibited constitutionally protected speech, the 
Supreme Court examined the effect of the Act on sexually explicit speech between adults, teens researching prison 
rape, and a parent sending information on birth control to a seventeen-year-old college freshmen.  Id. at 876-78  
(examining among other implications the chilling effect on speech of knowledge that a minor was present in a 100 
person chatroom).  Id. 
 57. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 116 n.12 (1990) (“We normally do not allow a defendant to challenge a 
law as it is applied to others. In the First Amendment context, however, we have said that ‘[b]ecause of the    
sensitive nature of constitutionally protected expression, we have not required that all those subject to overbroad 
regulations risk prosecution to test their rights.  For free expression -- of transcendent value to all society, and not 
merely to those exercising their rights -- might be the loser.’”). 
 58. 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down a statute criminalizing homosexual sodomy). 
 59. 481 U.S. 739 (1987). 
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abortion context must prove not only the alleged violation of the third party’s 
rights, but a violation of the defendant’s rights as well.  As it is pointless for a   
defendant to simply add an additional requirement to a case, a criminal defendant 
has no reason to ever raise potential violations of a third party’s rights. 
Salerno involved a facial challenge to the Bail Reform Act of 1984, which     
allowed the government to detain a person without bail before trial “if the        
Government demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence after an adversary 
hearing that no release conditions ‘will reasonably assure . . . the safety of any  
other person and the community.’”60  Two high ranking members of the Genovese 
crime family who had been arrested and held without bail pursuant to the Act 
brought the challenge.61 In analyzing the case, the Court claimed that no          
overbreadth doctrine had been accepted in cases outside of the First Amendment.62  
The Court then said this meant that “the challenger must establish that no set of 
circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.”63 Under this             
exceptionally stringent no set of circumstances test, the Court held that the Act 
could not be considered in violation of substantive due process or the Eighth 
Amendment protection against excessive bail.  By reasoning that the detention was 
not punitive, but rather regulatory, as it was aimed to prevent crime rather than to 
punish those charged with violent crimes, the Court held that there was no violation 
of substantive due process.64  This result was aided by the numerous safeguards 
present in the Act, as well as the fact that the Court was only attempting to        
determine whether the procedures in the Act were “adequate to authorize the    
pretrial detention of at least some [persons] charged with crimes.”65  The Act was 
also held not to violate the Eighth Amendment prohibition against excessive bail 
because the Court decided that the amendment only required that the amount of 
bail be balanced against the evil the government sought to regulate.66  No bail was 
necessary when the government interest was something other than risk of flight.67  
The Act was therefore upheld against the facial challenge.68 
Through Salerno, the Court dramatically changed facial challenges in both the 
criminal and civil context.69  The general view that third party standing must be 
allowed to contest the validity of criminal charges has little meaning in a          
 ________________________  
 60. Id. at 741. 
 61. Id. at 743. 
 62. Id. at 745.  As discussed in the section on abortion, overbreadth is in fact recognized in both First 
Amendment and abortion challenges. 
 63. Id.  This in effect shifts the power of the hypothetical from the person bringing the claim where a single 
hypothetical plaintiff means the case can be heard to the government, which can completely stop the challenge 
with one hypothetical plaintiff for which the law could be valid. 
 64. Id. at 748.  The Court saw little difference between the type of detention at issue and other instances of 
detention without criminal conviction including the detention of dangerous individuals before deportation and the 
detention of dangerous individuals who are proven incompetent to stand trial.  Id. at 748-49.  
 65. Id. at 751 (quoting Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 264 (1984)). 
 66. Id. at 754. 
 67. Id. at 755. 
 68. Id.  
 69. Anderson v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 143, 155 (1995), provides an example of Salerno applied to a civil 
case.  In Anderson, the Court determined that California was free to determine how to compute families when 
determining welfare benefits.  Id. at 147.   
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post-Salerno world.  Criminal charges are harder under a Salerno standard than 
they would have been in a civil facial challenge, as the criminal defendant must 
prove that the defendant’s specific crime constitutes a violation as well (otherwise 
at least one instance would exist where the law had been applied in a constitutional 
manner).  There is therefore no reason for a defendant to seek third party standing 
to challenge the constitutionality of a law, as a personal constitutional violation 
must nevertheless be proved.70 The only exceptions to this requirement are      
overbreadth in First Amendment (and presumably abortion) cases, where universal 
unconstitutionality is not required. 
Cases challenging convictions are therefore highly focused on the First 
Amendment, one of the few remaining areas of law where a statute must not be 
shown to be invalid in every possible application.  An example of such a case is 
Virginia v. Black, where the Court held invalid a Virginia statute that prohibited 
cross burning with the intent to intimidate but did not require separate proof of the 
intent to intimidate.71  The statute therefore failed to distinguish between cross 
burning intended to intimidate and cross burning intended as political speech or 
artistic expression.72 
Were the United States to take seriously the command that one should not be 
punished under an unconstitutional law or based on unconstitutional activity, a 
great deal more litigation would be required.  For instance, it would be necessary to 
allow criminal defendants to challenge unconstitutional searches and seizures   
regardless of whether the defendant possessed a Fourth Amendment right to     
privacy in the area and to allow the person charged to defend the constitutional 
rights of the person illegally searched—a result the Supreme Court has explicitly 
rejected. 
While Salerno has stopped nearly all third party challenges by criminal         
defendants to the statute under which the criminal was convicted, a few scattered 
standing exceptions remain.  Unconstitutional conduct during jury selection is one 
remaining challenge a criminal defendant can make invoking the rights of others.  
This category is epitomized by Powers v. Ohio, in which a white defendant was 
able to challenge black exclusions from the jury pool.73  However, the logic behind 
Powers, that one should not be convicted based on unconstitutional procedures, has 
not led to an exception outside jury selection.  Powers is best thought of as another 
issue specific hole in the traditional bar to third party standing created by courts to 
vindicate a specific constitutional right. It does not mean that criminals are        
allowed to challenge other procedural constitutional violations leading to their  
conviction or, as described, much Fourth Amendment law would need to be thrown 
out.  Powers merely created a small opening to challenge juror selection, and is 
another typically American exception for a challenge in a specific type of case. 
 ________________________  
 70. It would therefore be foolish to make an overbreadth argument since the criminal defendant would need 
to prove a personal violation in addition to counteracting any hypothetical person produced by the government. 
 71. 538 U.S. 343, 367 (2003). 
 72. Id. at 366. 
 73. 499 U.S. 400, 416 (1991). 
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American rights cases are therefore categorized by very limited circumstances 
in which the rights of others can be protected in both the civil and criminal context, 
with issue specific exceptions having arisen in each.  While the Court repeatedly 
states that the Constitution in fact prohibits one from bringing a case claiming to 
protect the rights of others, the Court’s actions indicate that the Constitution merely 
prefers that one bring a case to protect one’s own rights. The exceptions in     
American law could not exist were the Constitution the extreme ban it is claimed to 
be.  The problems caused by the American approach, and the additional standing 
exceptions it has required, are dealt with later. Now, it is time to contrast the     
scattered American approach with the coherent approach adopted by the Canadians 
for standing in rights protecting cases. 
B. Rights-Based Challenges in Canada 
In contrast to the United States, which has a number of different approaches 
through which plaintiffs seek standing for third party claims, civil rights-based 
challenges in Canada all now follow the same analytical framework.  If the plaintiff 
cannot show individual injury sufficient to provide standing, the court will analyze 
whether public interest standing should be granted. Public interest standing is   
explicitly discretionary, as the test asks the court to determine whether a particular 
plaintiff should be allowed to make the argument, but it has nevertheless opened 
Canadian courts to a broad range of challenges while consolidating and unifying 
the case law on standing.  Similarly, standing has also been broadened and       
standardized for criminals to defend against allegedly unconstitutional statutes.  
Standing in criminal cases, does not rely on the same test used in general civil 
suits, granting defendants broader standing to challenge the statute under which 
they were convicted than they would be under traditional public interest standing 
and in a more coherent manner than the way in which overbreadth is used in the 
United States. 
1. Public Interest Standing in Civil Cases in Canada 
Canadian rights protection through public interest standing evolved over three 
cases that predate the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which was      
enshrined as the initial part of the Canadian Constitution in 1982.74  The bill of 
rights relied on before this point was far weaker than the Charter and many rights 
were still determined through the common law.  Given the importance the courts 
played in acknowledging and determining these rights, these cases demonstrate 
how broader rights protection leads to broader standing.  In each case, the Court 
noted that the right the plaintiff sought to protect would be virtually impossible to 
 ________________________  
 74. A fourth case, discussed in the section on administrative challenges in Canada and decided after the 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, made the doctrine applicable to administrative challenges as well, see infra note 
173 and accompanying text.  
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protect through traditional standing requirements and expanded standing           
accordingly.75 
The first case, Thorson v. Canada (Attorney General), was brought as a      
taxpayer suit.76  Thorson brought suit seeking a determination that the Official 
Languages Act77 and the appropriations provisions providing for it were            
unconstitutional.78  The Ontario Court of Appeal denied standing, holding that a 
taxpayer suffered no greater injury than other members of the population and,   
accordingly, did not have the requisite special injury required for standing.79  The 
Canadian Supreme Court, in contrast, was more concerned with “whether a     
question of constitutionality should be immunized from judicial review by denying 
standing to anyone to challenge the impugned statute.”80  Rather than decide the 
broader questions governing such suits, the Court chose to retain discretion both 
with regard to whether to grant the initial request for standing and whether to issue 
the declaratory order that had been sought.81 
The Court also drew a distinction between the role of courts in enforcing     
disputes related to the public that occur between two private parties, such as a   
public nuisance action, where the constitutional validity of legislation is not in 
doubt, and suits seeking to ensure that the legislature itself has acted in accordance 
with constitutional requirements.82  While the Court analyzed a number of prior 
taxpayer standing suits, the case appeared to break from that tradition stating “[i]t 
is not the alleged waste of public funds alone that will support standing but rather 
the right of the citizenry to constitutional behaviour by Parliament where the issue 
in such behaviour is justiciable as a legal question.”83 
The second case, MacNeil v. Nova Scotia (Board of Censors),84 concerned a 
free speech challenge.85  MacNeil challenged the Theatres and Amusements Act86 
as well as regulations promulgated under the Act as being beyond the powers of the 
legislature.87  The suit was brought after the plaintiff was informed that the Nova 
 ________________________  
 75. While this is also what happened in the United States, the Canadian Court differed from the U.S. in 
using cases addressing different rights to form a single coherent doctrine for this new and expanded standing, 
rather than creating the piecemeal exceptions seen in the United States. 
 76. [1975] 1 S.C.R. 138, ¶ 10.  Canadian courts no longer reference the concept of taxpayer suits as the 
idea has been subsumed within public interest standing. 
 77. 1968-69 (Can.), c. 54 (declaring both English and French to be the official languages of Canada and 
regulating that both languages be available wherever warranted by sufficient population size). 
 78. Thorson, 1 S.C.R. 138, ¶ 10. 
 79. Id. ¶ 11. 
 80. Id. ¶ 12.  The Court also noted that the Attorney General had declined as request to litigate the validity 
of the tested legislation.   Id. ¶ 13.  This does not appear decisive, however, as the Court questioned whether it was 
proper to require that a potential litigant first seek assistance from a body charged with enforcing Parliamentary 
legislation.  Id. ¶ 14. 
 81. Id. ¶ 15. 
 82. Id. ¶¶ 19-20. 
 83. Id. ¶ 39. 
 84. [1976] 2 S.C.R. 265 (Can.).  
 85. The plaintiff sought to challenge action that could be considered both legislative and administrative, 
however, all challenges concerned the right to free speech, and the Court did not distinguish between the two when 
evaluating whether standing had been demonstrated. I therefore consider this a rights case rather than an        
administrative case.  Id. 
 86. R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 304. 
 87. MacNeil, 2 S.C.R. 265. 
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Scotia Board of Censors had determined that the film the “Last Tango in Paris” 
would not be permitted to be shown in Nova Scotia.88  The Court noted that the Act 
could, in one sense, be interpreted as regulating only the movie theaters and other 
businesses subject to direct control under the Act.89  However, the interest of the 
theaters would not necessarily be the same as the interest of the general public, and 
the public deserved the opportunity to protect its right to free speech.90  While the 
theaters undoubtedly possessed standing to challenge decisions under the Act, this 
did not exclude ordinary citizens from challenging the power of the Board to exert 
almost complete control over what was shown in the province.91  As the case had 
come up only on the procedural question, the Court did not address the merits of 
the case, holding only that the plaintiff appeared to have standing sufficient to 
bring the suit.92 
The third case in the trilogy was Borowski v. Canada (Minister of Justice).93  
Borowski was brought by a taxpayer to challenge a statute that decriminalized  
certain abortions.94  The suit was for the protection of the right to life of the fetus 
and was the first public interest standing case brought under the Canadian Bill of 
Rights.95  The Court examined the prior two cases before noting that, in this case, 
since the legislation had decriminalized certain types of abortions that previously 
would have been subject to penalty, the Court could not expect to find “any class of 
person directly affected or exceptionally prejudiced by it who would have cause to 
attack the legislation.”96  The Court also noted that, while “the issue as to the scope 
of the Canadian Bill of Rights in the protection of the human right to life is a    
matter of considerable importance,” a fetus itself could not be expected to be a 
party to a court proceeding.97  The Court summarized the prior two cases as stating 
that: 
to establish status as a plaintiff in a suit seeking a declaration that 
legislation is invalid, if there is a serious issue as to its invalidity, a 
person need only show that he is affected by it directly or that he 
has a genuine interest as a citizen in the validity of the legislation 
 ________________________  
 88. Id. ¶ 5. 
 89. Id. ¶ 10. 
 90. Id.  The Court viewed the businesses directly regulated by the Act as potentially being subject to  
“administrative law features” of the Act.  Id. ¶¶ 8-9. 
 91. Id. ¶ 10.  The Court also noted, again, that the Attorney General had decided not to pursue a challenge 
to the legislation, believing it to be within the power of the legislature, although this statement does not appear to 
have affected the reasoning.  Id. ¶ 5. 
 92. Id. ¶ 13. 
 93. [1981] 2 S.C.R. 575 (Can.). 
 94. Id. ¶ 31. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. ¶ 50.  The Court had also already noted, however, that the theater owners specifically affected by 
the challenged legislation in MacNeil had not been expected to show a prohibited movie and challenge the statute 
in a resulting criminal action, so the lack of a negatively affected class does not appear to be a deciding factor in 
the decision.  Id. ¶ 48.  The Court also noted that, even were the husband of a wife affected by the legislation and 
who did not want the abortion to proceed to attack it, the length of a court case was much longer than the length of 
a pregnancy.  Id.  ¶ 52. 
 97. Id. ¶ 53. 
17
: Third Party Standing
Published by Digital Commons @ Barry Law, 2011
132 Barry Law Review Vol. 16 
 
and that there is no other reasonable and effective manner in which 
the issue may be brought before the court.98 
Finding this test met, the Court granted standing.99 
All three cases were then summarized in Canadian Council of Churches v. 
R.,100 a post-Charter case and the currently cited case on public interest standing, as 
requiring a three part test: 
First, is there a serious issue raised as to the invalidity of           
legislation in question? Second, has it been established that the 
plaintiff is directly affected by the legislation or, if not, does the 
plaintiff have a genuine interest in its validity? Third, is there 
another reasonable and effective way to bring the issue before the 
court?101 
The Churches Court considered, and rejected, an argument to expand public  
interest standing further.102  Instead, the Court focused on the third requirement of 
the test.103 
The case was brought by the Council of Churches, an organization that assisted 
churches with the resettlement of refugees.104  The Council brought a challenge to 
revised immigration laws passed by Parliament that changed the procedure used to 
determine whether a person qualified as a refugee.105  This facial challenge was 
brought the day the Act went into effect, “seeking a declaration that many if not 
most of the amended provisions violated the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms and the Canadian Bill of Rights.”106 
While the Court accepted that the issue was serious, and the Council of 
Churches had a genuine interest in the subject matter, it was not convinced that the 
issue was required to be brought by the Council.107  The Court noted “[t]he       
challenged legislation . . . directly affects all refugee claimants in this country. 
Each one of them has standing to initiate a constitutional challenge to secure his or 
her own rights under the Charter.”108  The Council had argued that potential     
refugees would have a difficult time challenging the regulation, but the Court   
disagreed, taking judicial notice of the fact that refugee applicants had in fact    
appealed decisions under the law being challenged.109  Noting that the basis for 
granting public interest standing was to ensure that legislation could not remain 
 ________________________  
 98. Id. ¶ 56. 
 99. Id.  
 100. [1992] 1 S.C.R. 236 (Can.). 
 101. Id. ¶ 37. 
 102. Id. ¶ 36. 
 103. Id. ¶ 40. 
 104. Id. ¶ 2. 
 105. Id. ¶ 3. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. ¶ 38-40. 
 108. Canadian Churches, 1 S.C.R. 236, ¶ 40. 
 109. Id. 
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unchallenged and preferring “a clear, concrete factual background upon which the 
decision of the court could be based,” the Court denied standing to the Council.110 
Together, these cases set forth a clear test that a civil plaintiff must meet to be 
granted public interest standing.  In particular, a plaintiff seeking public interest 
standing must demonstrate that it is unlikely a plaintiff with direct standing will be 
able to bring the case. The plaintiffs in Churches failed this test because            
immigrants were already challenging immigration laws.  The case would have 
come out differently if immigrants were unable to challenge the law.  It is unclear, 
however, how Canadian courts would handle a civil equivalent of Powers v. 
Ohio,111 the jury case in the United States where the Court reasoned that black 
prospective jurors were unlikely to challenge their dismissal.  Canadian courts, like 
all common law courts, prefer cases presenting concrete facts brought by those 
most affected.  However, were a similar civil case to arise, it is likely that a     
demonstration that any party directly affected would have no reason to come    
forward would still be sufficient to demonstrate that it was neither reasonable nor 
effective to wait for such a challenge.  Powers would unquestionably be allowed in 
the criminal context, as Canada now has automatic third party standing in criminal 
cases. 
2. Rights-based Challenges in Criminal Cases in Canada 
The broadened Canadian approach to civil standing in rights cases has been 
further expanded in the criminal context.  In contrast to the American Constitution, 
which is generally said to form an outer limit to permissible standing, the Canadian 
Constitution has been used to broaden standing in both criminal and administrative 
cases.  In the criminal context, the Constitution requires that a criminal defendant 
be allowed to defend against a charge by claiming a violation of the rights of a 
third party, thus ensuring that no one can be convicted under an unconstitutional 
law. 
In 1988, in R. v. Morgentaler,112 this expanded standing requirement forced the 
Canadian Supreme Court to address the constitutionality of an abortion law.  When 
abortion had been previously raised in 1975, parliamentary supremacy remained 
the guiding rule.  The Court had therefore deferred to Parliament and avoided the 
issue.113  However, when the issue arose again in 1988, the Canadian Constitution 
was in force, and it was the Court, rather than Parliament, that had the final duty to 
ensure all laws were constitutional. 
The appellants in the 1988 Morgentaler case were abortion providers who had 
set up an abortion clinic together.114 At this clinic, abortions were performed   
 ________________________  
 110. Id. ¶¶ 40-42. 
 111. 499 U.S. 400, 416 (1991). 
 112. [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 (Can.). 
 113. Morgentaler v. The Queen, [1976] 1 S.C.R. 616, 671 (Can.).  The Canadian Court at the time was 
therefore not acting as the type of final rights determining court that has pushed the standing barriers to protect 
rights. 
 114. Morgentaler, 1 S.C.R. 30 at 50. 
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without the statutorily required preapproval certificate.115  The three providers were 
charged with violating the applicable abortion statutes.116  After an acquittal at trial, 
the crown appealed.  The acquittal was overturned by an appellate judge, and a new 
trial was ordered.117  In the appeal, the Court held that the abortion procedures  
specified in the law did “not comport with the principles of fundamental justice” as 
required in section 7 of the Charter.118  In doing so, the Court made a determination 
of the validity of the abortion statutes on third parties as part of the criminal 
process for the doctors charged with violating that law. 
A similar result was reached in R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd..119  In Big M, a  
corporation was allowed to challenge a Sunday closing law after having been 
charged with a violation of such a statute.  The corporation claimed the law       
infringed upon the right to freedom of religion in the Canadian Bill of Rights.120  In 
allowing the appeal, the Court relied on section 52 of the Constitution, which states 
“[t]he Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any law that is 
inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the          
inconsistency, of no force or effect.”121  In response to the argument that Big M., as 
a corporation, could not hold a religious belief, the Court answered: 
The undoubted corollary to be drawn from this principle is that no 
one can be convicted of an offence under an unconstitutional law. 
The respondent did not come to court voluntarily as an interested 
citizen asking for a prerogative declaration that a statute is         
unconstitutional. If it had been engaged in such “public interest  
litigation” it would have had to fulfill the status requirements laid 
down by this Court in the trilogy of “standing” cases but that was 
not the reason for its appearance in Court.  Any accused, whether 
corporate or individual, may defend a criminal charge by arguing 
that the law under which the charge is brought is constitutionally 
invalid. Big M is urging that the law under which it has been 
charged is inconsistent with s. 2(a) of the Charter and by reason of 
s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982, it is of no force or effect.  
Whether a corporation can enjoy or exercise freedom of religion is 
therefore irrelevant.122 
 ________________________  
 115. Id.  
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 51. 
 118. Id. at 73.  The Court went on to hold that these procedures were not saved by a proportionality analysis 
under s.1 of the Charter.  Id. at 75-76.  These findings were echoed by another judge in the plurality opinion.  Id. at 
81-82 (Beetz., J., concurring). 
 119. [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 (Can). 
 120. Id. ¶ 2.  
 121. Constitution Act, 1982, s. 52. 
 122. [1985] 1 S.C.R. ¶ 39.  
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The Court went on to hold that the Sunday closing law had a religious basis 
and, therefore, violated the right to freedom of religion.123  This result was cited 
approvingly in a concurrence by the Chief Justice in Ontario v. Canadian Pacific 
Ltd,124 where the Court allowed a corporation to argue that an environmental law 
the corporation had been charged with was vague and overbroad.125 Neither      
argument was ultimately successful, but the Court did allow the appeal to be heard, 
which it might not have were a criminal prosecution not at issue.126 
Both Canada and the United States have created exceptions to the traditional 
standing rules in order to protect rights.  Australia, which does not have the same 
tradition of strong rights protection by the High Court, has not seen the type of 
rights cases that led courts in the U.S. and Canada to expand rights, and has    
therefore retained the traditional standing requirements. 
C.  Rights-based Challenges in Australia 
Australia has no written bill of rights, resulting in far fewer rights than the 
United States and Canada at the federal level.  Australia has recognized at least a 
limited right to free speech, but the right is generally litigated in the defamation 
context, which does not present a third party standing issue.  While the existence of 
a right to abortion has been mentioned in the Australian High Court, legislation 
regarding abortion has been left to the states, as have challenges.  A federal court 
denied standing in one of the few challenges related to abortion.  However, the 
challenge was brought not by a group seeking to increase access to abortions, but 
by a group seeking to prevent the importation into the country of a drug used for 
abortions.127 The rights of those seeking an abortion were therefore not at risk were 
standing to be denied, a similar instance to one of the few times a United States 
court has denied standing in an abortion case.128 Faced with no significant        
challenge to a right, and no need to expand standing to protect that right, it is of 
little surprise that Australia has yet to expand beyond the traditional standing    
requirements. 
D. Rights-based Challenges Conclusion 
Both the United States and Canada have recognized the need to broaden   
standing to ensure the protection of certain rights. As a consequence, the           
traditional bar against third party standing has not remained solid in either country.  
However, the approaches taken to deal with this issue have differed dramatically.  
 ________________________  
 123. Id. ¶ 151.  The Court also held that the provision failed a section 1 proportionality analysis.  Id. at 353.  
While the Court struck down the law at issue, it did note that a similar law enacted for a secular purpose, such as 
providing a day of rest, would be permissible.  Id. at 354. 
 124. 1995 Can. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 22 (Lamer, C.J., concurring).  
 125. Id. at 53-54. 
 126. Id. at 108-09. 
 127. Right to Life Association (NSW) Inc. v. Secretary, Department of Human Services and Health, (1995) 
37 A.L.D. 357 (Austl.). 
 128. Id. 
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American courts have remained satisfied with a right by right approach, creating 
specific exceptions where deemed necessary given the nature of the particular right 
at stake, aided by a reliance on the hypothetical injured parties created by          
attorneys.  In Canada, by contrast, standing is far more uniform.  Standing in    
Canada has also remained distinct from the merits, in contrast to overbreadth   
analysis in the United States where the two are often combined.  This distinction 
between the merits and standing has also allowed Canada to grant greater leeway to 
those charged with a crime to challenge the constitutional basis of their charge, 
setting a lower threshold for standing to challenge an offense with which one has 
been charged than to make a general facial challenge to a statute. The United States 
refuses to grant expanded standing to criminal defendants, effectively making it 
impossible for a criminal defendant to argue that a statute violates the right of a 
third party rather than the defendant, and allowing convictions under laws that 
might be unconstitutional but cannot be challenged. Australia, in contrast,         
demonstrates the stability of traditional standing when the Court is not the         
predominant rights protecting body in the government.  The implications of these 
differences are explored in Part III. 
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE RIGHTS-DRIVEN NATURE OF STANDING 
The rights-driven exceptions discussed in the previous section have had an  
impact in a wide variety of third party cases. In Canada, the broad standing       
accorded to rights challenges opened the door to similarly broad standing in      
administrative law challenges.  In contrast, in the United States, the issue by issue 
approach to expanded standing has failed to create a coherent doctrine. This has 
affected rights cases by reducing the number of rights accorded such protection and 
has also affected administrative cases. Standing in environmental cases in         
particular has gone through a dramatic expansion and retraction.  While prior rights 
exceptions made the earlier environmental expansion possible, the lack of a      
coherent doctrine meant that there was nothing to secure the gains made. All  
standing exceptions in the United States can be removed at any time;                 
environmental standing was simply a victim of this fragility. This lack of          
coherence has also resulted in the creation of association standing in the United 
States, allowing many cases to be brought that would qualify under public interest 
standing in Canada.  Like the United States, Australia has virtually no third party 
standing, despite calls to create Canadian style public interest standing in          
administrative cases.  Such a proposal has had difficulty gaining traction because 
there is no established third party standing doctrine developed through rights cases 
from which to expand.  This section first explores the issues faced in environmental 
standing before addressing the issue of association standing. 
A. Implications for Administrative Challenges  
In commonwealth systems, when plaintiffs challenge a statute passed by the 
legislature, the plaintiffs generally argue that the statute violates fundamental 
rights, whether enshrined in a written constitution or established through prior case 
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law.  Once it has been established that the judiciary, rather than Parliament, is the 
guarantor of rights, courts must accept rights-based challenges, and the only    
question becomes how far to extend the rules of standing to ensure that rights are 
protected. 
Administrative challenges are different.  The challenge is generally a failure of 
the administration to follow proper procedures, or an argument that an               
administrative interpretation of a law is not consistent with the interpretation     
intended by the legislature when it drafted the enabling statute.  In this area, as in 
rights cases, Canada uses the broad and uniform doctrine of public interest     
standing.  American courts, in contrast, generally reject challenges seeking to   
vindicate the administrative interests of a third party.  Australia follows a similar 
approach to the U.S.; the Australian High Court has essentially retained the original 
standing requirements.  This is despite calls in Australia for the same type of broad 
public interest administrative standing used in Canada. The reluctance of the    
Australian High Court to expand administrative standing can be explained by the 
lack of prior rights cases that pushed the standing barriers, as happened in both the 
U.S. and Canada. 
1. Administrative Challenges in the United States 
In the United States, as in the other countries examined, third party standing in 
administrative cases has become most contentious in environmental challenges.  In 
the 1970s, standing in environmental cases was easy to achieve based on vague 
potential harm claimed by the plaintiff.  However, since then, and particularly from 
the time Justice Scalia joined the Court, standing has required increasingly concrete 
injury displays and has faced an increasing overlap with ripeness.  At this point, 
administrative cases can no longer proceed unless the plaintiff (or members of the 
plaintiff, if the plaintiff is an organization) can demonstrate concrete personal   
injury, eliminating the possibility of many challenges to diffuse harms.129 
Environmental standing first gained prominence in the early 1970s in Sierra 
Club v. Morton.130 The Sierra Club, a national environmental protection            
organization, brought suit to challenge a National Forest Service decision to allow 
the development of a ski resort in a mountainous area of California.131  Access to 
the resort would require the construction of a twenty mile highway, a portion of 
which would cross the Sequoia National Park, as well as a high voltage power line 
for the resort.132  As the Sierra Club was suing under the Administrative Procedure 
Act, which had already been held to grant very broad standing to those challenging 
administrative actions, the Court “d[id] not question” that the road and powerline 
 ________________________  
 129. Such cases are, however, still properly considered third party standing cases because it is understood by 
all parties that the goal is broader protection rather than a specific grievance complained of by the plaintiff,   
because the plaintiff is generally seeking to make an abstract claim against the government, such as a procedural 
challenge against a regulation, and because such cases could, alternatively, be viewed as third party standing cases 
as they are in Canada. 
 130. 405 U.S. 727 (1972). 
 131. Id. at 728-29. 
 132. Id. at 729. 
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slated for construction through the Sequoia National Park could cause harm,   
creating “an ‘injury in fact’ sufficient to lay the basis for standing.”133  The Court in 
fact noted that “[a]esthetic and environmental well-being, like economic          
well-being, are important ingredients of the quality of life in our society, and the 
fact that particular environmental interests are shared by the many rather than the 
few does not make them less deserving of legal protection through the judicial 
process.”134 
Standing was not granted, however, because the Sierra Club had not shown 
that the organization itself had suffered this type of injury.135  More specifically, 
The alleged injury will be felt directly only by those who use [the 
areas under development], and for whom the aesthetic and          
recreational values of the area[s] will be lessened by the highway 
and ski resort. The Sierra Club failed to allege that it or its     
members would be affected in any of their activities or pastimes by 
the . . . development.  Nowhere in the pleadings or affidavits did 
the Club state that its members use [the ski resort area] for any 
purpose, much less that they use it in any way that would be     
significantly affected by the proposed actions of the                   
respondents.136 
While standing was therefore denied in Sierra Club, the Court provided a clear 
roadmap for future cases to follow. Broad environmental concerns could create 
standing, provided the plaintiffs alleged a specific personal connection to the    
environment being harmed.  This roadmap was followed in United States v.      
Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP) in 1973.137 
SCRAP was brought by students from George Washington Law School to   
protest a decision of the Interstate Commerce Commission not to suspend a 2.5% 
increase in railroad freight rates.138  Specifically, the students in SCRAP contended 
that the decision could not have been made without an environmental impact 
statement, as required by the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.139  Such 
a statement was required for all “[f]ederal actions significantly affecting the quality 
of the human environment.”140  The Commission had not included a statement, 
because it found that the rate increase would not have a significant effect on the 
environment.141  The students, in contrast, claimed that increased freight rates on 
 ________________________  
 133. Id. at 734. 
 134. Id. This would no longer be the case today. 
 135. Id. at 734-35. 
 136. Id. at 735. 
 137. 412 U.S. 669 (1973). 
 138. Id. at 673-78.  The school is located in Washington, D.C. 
 139. Id. at 679. 
 140. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1969)). 
 141. Id. at 677. 
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recycled materials would drive down recycling rates, which would in turn         
adversely affect the environment.142 
When the standing of the students was challenged, the Court noted that “all 
persons who utilize the scenic resources of the country, and indeed all who breathe 
its air, could claim harm similar to that alleged by the environmental groups here.  
But we have already made it clear that standing is not to be denied simply because 
many people suffer the same injury.”143  The Court then noted that, in contrast to 
the plaintiffs in Sierra Club, the SCRAP plaintiffs had alleged that they personally 
had been injured.144  The SCRAP Court found the following statement sufficient to 
demonstrate standing: 
a general rate increase would allegedly cause increased use of non-
recyclable commodities as compared to recyclable goods, thus    
resulting in the need to use more natural resources to produce such 
goods, some of which resources might be taken from the       
Washington area, and resulting in more refuse that might be      
discarded in national parks in the Washington area.145 
While some wiggle room remained because the case had dealt with a motion to 
dismiss, for which the Court was required to accept all facts in the statement as 
true, after SCRAP, the courthouse door seemed wide open.  However, in 1992, in 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the Court began to very clearly shut that door.146 
The plaintiffs in Defenders of Wildlife challenged an administrative decision by 
the Secretary of the Interior that the consultation requirements of the Endangered 
Species Act did not apply in foreign countries.147  This rule contradicted a previous 
understanding between the Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Marine  
Fisheries Service that the consultation requirement did extend to foreign          
countries.148  The plaintiffs brought suit, claiming that this lack of consultation 
caused harm to endangered species overseas.149  Two affidavits became critical to 
establishing the standing of the organization.150  Both affidavits claimed that the 
authors had traveled to foreign countries and observed endangered species habitat, 
that this habitat was threatened by U.S. financed construction projects abroad, and 
that the authors hoped to be able to return and see the endangered species in the 
future.151  These statements would have been sufficient under the SCRAP standard. 
 ________________________  
 142. Id. at 681 n.9. 
 143. Id. at 687. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 688. 
 146. 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
 147. Id. at 557-58. The rule had been promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior.  Id.  More specifically, 
the rule stated that the Endangered Species Act would only apply in the United States or on “the high seas.”  Id.  
 148. Id. at 558. 
 149. Id. at 562. 
 150. Following the association standing requirements discussed in the next section, in which an association 
can demonstrate standing by showing that a member of that organization can show standing. 
 151. Id. at 563. 
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The Court summarized its prior standing cases in a three-prong test requiring: 
that the alleged harm violate a “concrete and particularized” legally protected   
interest that is “actual or imminent,”152 that the injury be “fairly . . . trace[able] to 
the challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . [a] third party not before the 
court,”153 and that the injury will “‘likely’. . . be ‘redressed by a favorable         
decision.’”154  The affidavits, the Court found, failed “at least” the injury and    
redressability prongs.155 
The Court found no imminent injury, as the affiants had provided no concrete 
statements about when they would return to the overseas endangered species     
habitat, and “‘some day’ intentions” were insufficient.156  The Court also found a 
lack of redressability because the organization was challenging a general          
government decision not to require consultation rather than individual projects  
alleged to be damaging the environment.157  This strict focus on the constitutional 
requirements has redefined much of the standing analysis in the United States   
today. 
This decision has had serious consequences. Requiring that a plaintiff        
demonstrate a concrete harm prevents many systematic challenges from being 
brought while simultaneously making clear to agencies how to moot the few cases 
that are brought.  This serves to virtually grind abstract challenges to agency action 
to a halt, even though such challenges are still allowed in First Amendment cases 
in the United States.  This can be seen in the recent Supreme Court case of     
Summers v. Earth Island Institute,158 which was brought by a number of            
environmental organizations to challenge a decision by the Forest Service to     
“exempt small fire-rehabilitation and timber-salvage projects from the notice, 
comment, and appeal process used by the Forest Service for more significant land 
management decisions.”159  The nearly impossible position plaintiffs now find 
themselves in is demonstrated by the organization members in this case. 
Ara Marderosian, the first affiant, alleged that he had visited a specific Forest 
Service area covered by the new policies, had imminent plans to do so again, and 
“that his interests in viewing the flora and fauna of the area would be harmed if the 
[salvage project] went forward without incorporation of the ideas he would have 
suggested if the Forest Service had provided him an opportunity to comment.”160  
The government had conceded this was sufficient to establish standing in the    
district court.161  The case was even considered strong enough for the district court 
to grant a temporary injunction.162  However, after the injunction had been issued, 
 ________________________  
 152. Id. at 560 (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)). 
 153. Id. (quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976)). 
 154. Id. (quoting Simon, 426 U.S. at 38, 43). 
 155. Id. at 562. 
 156. Id. at 564. 
 157. Id. at 568. 
 158. 129 S. Ct. 1142 (2009). 
 159. Id. at 1147. 
 160. Id.  
 161. Id.  
 162. Id. at 1149. 
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the parties settled.163  This settlement resolved the dispute over the particular area, 
and in so doing removed Marderosian’s standing.164 
The other affiant was Jim Bensman, who alleged past injury from development 
on Forest Service land and predicted harm from future development occurring  
under the challenged regulations.165  Neither allegation was sufficient.  The past 
harm was insufficient, because the development was not connected with the     
challenged regulations.166  The future harm was insufficient because it was not  
specific enough.167  As to Bensman’s claim that “he has visited many National  
Forests and plans to visit several unnamed National Forests in the future,” the 
Court found the statement to be too vague, because he had not specified which 
particular projects he felt were “unlawfully subject to the regulations.”168  As to 
Bensman’s claim that “a series of projects in the Allegheny National Forest” were 
unlawfully subject to the regulations, the Court found the statement insufficient 
because it failed to demonstrate when Bensman planned to return to the area.169  
This relied on the same “some day” insufficiency as Defenders of Wildlife.170  The 
dissent, in contrast, noted that Bensman specifically described areas of concern, 
including “a salvage-timber sale scheduled for the Hoosier National Forest—an 
area Bensman had visited ‘multiple times’ and to which he planned to return in the 
coming weeks.”171Regarding the Allegheny National Forest, in the dissent’s      
version of the facts: 
Bensman [stated that he] has visited 70 National Forests, that he 
has visited some of those forests “hundreds of times,” that he has 
often visited the Allegheny National Forest in the past, that he has 
“probably commented on a thousand” Forest Service projects     
including salvage-timber sale proposals, that he intends to continue 
to comment on similar Forest Service proposals, and that the    
Forest Service plans in the future to conduct salvage-timber sales 
on 20 parcels in the Allegheny National Forest—one of the forests 
he has visited in the past.172 
As the dissent noted, Bensman’s claim comes very close to that of the other  
affiant in specifying the detail of the injury.173  The dissent felt that the fact that the 
Forest Service had conceded that thousands of projects would be exempt from  
notice and comment in the future should be sufficient to show a likelihood of    
 ________________________  
 163. Id.  
 164. Id. at 1149-50. 
 165. Id. at 1150. 
 166. Id.  
 167. Id.  
 168. Id.  
 169. Id. at 1150-51. 
 170. Id.  
 171. Id. at 1158 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 172. Id. at 1157 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 173. Id.  
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injury—a policy utterly inconsistent with the high level of specificity demanded by 
the majority.174  Under the majority’s rule, there is virtually no way to present an 
abstract challenge to an administrative regulation, even where, as in this case, the 
claim made against the regulation does not regard the particular parcel at issue but 
is instead a procedural challenge to the issuance of the regulation, for which the 
specifics of any particular parcel are irrelevant. 
While the Court was essentially correct in noting that there was no precedent 
for allowing a suit to continue after the sole injury used to grant standing had been 
resolved,175 this situation was created only because the Court required such a    
specific description of the problem rather than examining the case through the eyes 
of a fictional plaintiff.  Were the problem viewed through the eyes of a fictional 
plaintiff, as many First Amendment and abortion challenges are, the Court would 
have addressed the real action being challenged, the agency decision, rather than 
forcing the discussion to specific relatively inconsequential actions based on that 
decision which, when resolved, will then disappear. 
It is generally good policy for cases to conclude when an agreement has been 
reached between the parties.  However, what might make sense when the issue is a 
contractual dispute makes far less sense when what is at issue is an agency action 
with a number of consequences.  In addressing each consequence individually, the 
Court misses the forest for the trees.  What matters in these cases is the original 
agency action, far more than any particular repercussion.  Ignoring this fact means 
many agency actions can never be fully challenged.  The diffuse harm suffered in 
environmental cases is little different than the diffuse harm suffered in               
Establishment Clause violations.  However, because American standing exceptions 
have become increasingly tightly bound to particular rights, the gains made in older 
environmental standing cases have been lost.  A more coherent standing doctrine 
would simplify the cases for both rights challenges and administrative challenges.  
An example of this type of doctrine can be seen in Canada. 
2. Administrative Standing in Canada 
In contrast to the United States, Canada has taken a broad approach to third 
party standing that requires rights-based challenges and administrative challenges 
to follow the same public interest standing analysis.  Canada also shows how a 
court system can build on rights-based exceptions to expand standing to            
administrative challenges as well. 
Canada has the most consistent and liberal approach to third party standing of 
the three countries surveyed, applying public interest standing to both rights     
challenges and administrative challenges.  The decision to apply public interest 
standing to administrative cases was made by the Supreme Court in Finlay v.  
 ________________________  
 174. Id.  
 175. This type of showing is not required in voting cases, as the injury generally has been mooted, but the 
likelihood that the same injury could occur again and be mooted before resolution is sufficient to allow the initial 
case to proceed.  This is another particular exception to the supposed constitutional requirements.  A similar  
concern is raised in the abortion context if a pregnant woman brings the challenge. 
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Canada (Minister of Finance) in 1986.176  Finlay was brought by a Manitoban  
disability recipient.177  Before receiving state provided aid, Finlay had received 
municipal assistance, which was considered a loan rather than a gift.178 In          
consequence, when the state assistance began, five percent of Finlay’s disability 
benefits were deducted to repay this loan.179  Finlay claimed that this deduction was 
contrary to the statutory requirement that disability benefits be sufficient to meet a 
recipient’s basic requirements, because the repayment caused the amount received 
to fall below the amount determined to meet the basic requirements.180 The       
difference from prior public interest cases was that Finlay was not challenging the 
payment deduction as contrary to a constitutional right, but rather as contrary to the 
statute181 under which the payment plans operated.182  Finlay sought a declaration 
that the federal payments to Manitoba were illegal, as Manitoba was not complying 
with all requirements, and an injunction ordering the federal government to stop 
the payments, which would force Manitoba to comply with the requirements.183 
Analyzing the standing issue, the Court first considered whether Finlay met the 
special interest requirement allowing a party other than the Attorney General direct 
standing to seek declaratory and injunctive relief.184  Despite the fact that Finlay 
was conceded to currently be receiving an amount of benefits below that           
considered necessary for survival, Finlay was denied direct standing.185             
Analogizing to Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization,186 the 
Court found it insufficiently clear that a declaration that the federal payments were 
illegal would cause Manitoba to revise its payment policies.187  However, rather 
than stop there, as the U.S. Court had, the Canadian Court moved on to a           
determination of whether to extend the public interest analysis, noting that: 
This question raises again the policy considerations underlying 
judicial attitudes to public interest standing, and in particular, 
whether the same value is to be assigned to the public interest in 
the maintenance of respect for the limits of administrative           
authority as was assigned by this Court in Thorson, McNeil and 
Borowski to the public interest in the maintenance of respect for 
the limits of legislative authority.188 
 ________________________  
 176. [1986] 2 S.C.R. 607 (Can.). 
 177. Id. at 611. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at 612. 
 181. The Canada Assistance Plan, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-1.  
 182. 2 S.C.R. at 612. 
 183. Id. at 621-22. 
 184. Id. at 621. 
 185. Id. at 623-24. 
 186. 426 U.S. 26 (1976) (denying standing to plaintiffs because they had failed to demonstrate that the 
injury complained of was attributable to the defendants rather than to a third party). 
 187. 2 S.C.R. at 623-24. 
 188. Id. at 631. 
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The answer was a resounding yes. The Court saw no reason to treat             
administrative and legislative challenges differently, the issue was sufficiently  
serious, there did not appear to be any other way to get the matter before a court, 
and there could be no one with a more direct interest in the matter than Finlay.189  
Finlay was accordingly granted standing.190  Public interest standing in Canada 
followed a very clear path from rights-based challenges to administrative          
challenges.  In contrast, Australia, lacking the strong rights protections present in 
the United States and Canada, has never been forced to move away from the   
stringent standing requirements originally used in all three countries, and has yet to 
expand standing in administrative cases in the High Court, although possible signs 
of change have been noted in a lower level court. 
3. Administrative Standing in Australia 
Because Australia has much weaker rights protections than the U.S. and    
Canada, current standing doctrine in Australia has been driven by administrative 
cases rather than rights-based cases.  With no rights cases forcing the High Court to 
expand standing, there has not yet been a notable expansion in standing.  The cases 
laying the basic foundation of current standing in Australia are Australian        
Conservation Foundation Inc v. Commonwealth191 and Onus v. Alcoa of Australia 
Ltd.192  That both of these cases are administrative also reflects the statutory basis 
of many challenges, which leads to a more statute-centered standing analysis, and 
arguably offers less opportunity for expansion. 
The first of the two decisions, Australian Conservation Foundation Inc. v 
Commonwealth, a 1980 case, concerned a challenge to a proposed resort in  
Queensland.193  The case was brought by the Australian Conservation Foundation, 
an environmental organization, claiming that the resort had been approved by the 
administration without reviewing a final environmental impact statement and the 
approval was therefore in violation of environmental laws and regulations.194 
Justice Gibbs began by reviewing the standing law in England as stated in 
Boyce v. Paddington Borough Council:195 
A plaintiff can sue without joining the Attorney-General in two 
cases:  first,  where  the  interference  with  the  public  right  is 
such as that some private right of his is at the same time interfered 
with . . . ; and, secondly, where no private right is interfered with, 
but the plaintiff, in respect of his public right, suffers special   
 ________________________  
 189. Id. at 633-34. 
 190. Id. at 634.  The Court also noted that there was no reason to distinguish between public interest    
standing to seek declaratory relief and public interest standing to seek injunctive relief.  Id. at 635. 
 191. (1980) 146 C.L.R. 493 (Austl.). 
 192. (1981) 149 C.L.R. 27 (Austl.). 
 193. (1980) 146 C.L.R. 493 (Austl.). 
 194. Id. 
 195. [1903] 1 Ch. 109, at 114. 
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damage peculiar to himself from the interference with the public 
right.196 
While Gibbs attempted to remain faithful to Boyce, he also tried to clarify the 
language of the first exception by interpreting “special damage peculiar to himself” 
to mean “having a special interest in the subject matter of the action.”197  Gibbs 
also noted that the Australian courts operated under a different constitutional    
requirement than the Case or Controversy Clause in the United States, but that the 
approach he supported aligned with that used in the United States in Warth v.   
Seldin.198  Gibbs summarized his views as follows: 
I would not deny that a person might have a special interest in the 
preservation of a particular environment. However, an interest, for 
present purposes, does not mean a mere intellectual or emotional 
concern. A person is not interested within the meaning of the rule, 
unless he is likely to gain some advantage, other than the            
satisfaction of righting a wrong, upholding a principle or winning a 
contest, if his action succeeds or to suffer some disadvantage, other 
than a sense of grievance or a debt for costs, if his action fails. A 
belief, however strongly felt, that the law generally, or a particular 
law, should be observed, or that conduct of a particular kind 
should be prevented, does not suffice to give its possessor locus 
standi.  If that were not so, the rule requiring special interest would 
be meaningless. Any plaintiff who felt strongly enough to bring an 
action could maintain it.199 
Using this test, Gibbs was confident the Association had failed to show a    
special interest, and denied standing.200 Other judges agreed with Gibbs’           
conclusion, although some effort was made to leave open the potential for a  
broader basis for standing in constitutional challenges.201 
The year after Australian Conservation Foundation, the Court further clarified 
standing in a private environmental suit in Onus v Alcoa of Australia Ltd.202  Onus 
was brought by two Australians of aboriginal descent seeking an injunction to  
prevent Alcoa of Australia, an aluminum company, from building an aluminum 
smelter on land containing aboriginal artifacts.203  The plaintiffs claimed that Alcoa 
was operating in violation of a statute passed in the state of Victoria to protect 
 ________________________  
 196. 146 C.L.R. 493 (Austl.). 
 197. Id. 
 198. 422 U. S. 490 (1975).  Gibbs did not, however, address the trial court’s examination of Sierra Club v. 
Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) and U.S. v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 
U.S. 669 (1973). 
 199. 146 C.L.R. 493. 
 200. Id. 
 201. See id. opinions of Stephen J., and Mason J. 
 202. (1981) 36 A.L.R. 425 (Austl.). (no pinpoint cites in Lexis or Westlaw from the Court) 
 203. Id.  
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“Archaeological and Aboriginal Relics.”204  When the standing of the plaintiffs was 
challenged, the Court looked to the enhanced understanding of standing in        
Australian Conservation Foundation.205  Chief Justice Gibbs, in analyzing the  
decision, first noted that the rule was flexible and based on the subject matter at 
issue.206  As the plaintiffs had not shown that any personal right of theirs had been 
infringed, Gibbs looked to whether they had a special interest in the subject      
matter.207  Gibbs found such an interest, noting that the plaintiffs were not merely 
aborigines, but “members of the Gournditch-jmara people,” the group that had  
historically lived in the area.208  The Gournditch-jmara were also custodians of 
their relics according to their local laws.209 
Gibbs then addressed whether a mere “intellectual or emotional concern” was 
sufficient injury to create standing.210  His implicit statement to the contrary in  
Australian Conservation Foundation had been the basis for the denial of standing 
in the lower court.211  While not stepping back from the previous statement, Gibbs 
explained why the plaintiffs’ interest in this case went beyond a mere emotional 
concern as follows: 
The present is not a case in which a plaintiff sues in an attempt to 
give effect to his beliefs or opinions on a matter which does not  
affect him personally except in so far as he holds beliefs or       
opinions about it.  The appellants claim not only that their relics 
have a cultural and spiritual significance, but that they are         
custodians of them according to the laws and customs of their 
people, and that they actually use them.  The position of a small 
community of Aboriginal people of a particular group living in a 
particular area which that group has traditionally occupied, and 
which claims an interest in relics of their ancestors found in that 
area, is very different indeed from that of a diverse group of white 
Australians associated by some common opinion on a matter of 
social policy which might equally concern any other Australian.212 
The High Court therefore continued to require the type of particular injury at 
issue in traditional standing.  Australian Conservation Foundation and Onus have 
formed the basis of Australian standing law for nearly thirty years. 
 ________________________  
 204. Id.  
 205. Id.  
 206. Id.  
 207. Id.   
 208. Id.  
 209. Id.  
 210. Id.  
 211. Id.  
 212. Id.  Justice Stephen agreed in substance with Gibbs, but noted that it would be rare for a plaintiff  
demonstrating a special interest to not also have an intellectual and emotional interest in the case.  Id. (Stephen J, 
concurring). 
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Commentators, perhaps frustrated with the age of the High Court cases still  
being cited, have questioned whether Australian Conservation Foundation, Inc. v. 
Minister for Resources,213 a trial court decision, could signal a more modern     
approach to standing, possibly creating a form of Australian public interest     
standing.214  While the case does expand standing considerably beyond that       
previously allowed by the High Court, it is nevertheless a trial court case, and 
should not be considered a new approach for the country as much as a signal of the 
frustration felt by an individual judge.  
The trial court viewed the issue, preventing the export of woodchips from  
Australian forests, as being “one of the major environmental issues of the present 
time,” and noted that (at that time) a decade had passed since the High Court    
decision in Australian Conservation Foundation.215 Viewing standing as a        
decision made with community perceptions in mind, the court stated: 
In my opinion, the community at the present time expects that 
there will be a body such as the [Foundation] to concern itself with 
this particular issue and expects the [Foundation] to act in the   
public interest to put forward a conservation viewpoint as a    
counter to the viewpoint of economic exploitation.216 
Convinced that the Foundation was not merely a busybody, but was rather the 
body paid by the government to be particularly concerned with the South East  
forests, the court was convinced the Foundation had met the test for standing.217  
Or, as the court said, “[i]f the [Foundation] does not have a special interest in the 
South East forests, there is no reason for its existence.”218 
While the case might have resulted in a broader approach to environmental 
standing in Australia, there is little evidence that this case has changed Australian 
standing laws in the two decades since it was decided.219  Australian public interest 
 ________________________  
 213. (1989) 19 A.L.D. 70 (Austl.). 
 214. Id.  
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id.  While the case would represent a broader ability for organizations to challenge standing, and a 
broader version of standing than that available in the United States, Mark Squillace also questions the court’s 
decision to deny standing to an individual who complained: 
that he had personally suffered damage to the windshields on his motor vehicles from     
logging trucks, that he was personally disturbed by the noise from the loading of chip boats 
at night, and that he was personally upset by the loss of trees and the destruction of plant 
and animal habitat as a result of logging, was denied standing.  Surprisingly, the court      
denied Harewood standing because “[his] interest in the National Estate [was] little more 
than that of any ordinary member of the community.”  [While he] plainly would have been 
granted standing in a U.S. court since he alleged to have suffered specific, personal injuries 
that might be redressed by a favorable ruling on the merits. 
Mark Squillace, An American Perspective on Environmental Impact Assessment in Australia, 20 COLUM. J. 
ENVTL. L. 43 (1995)(citing Australian Conservation Found., 19 A.L.D. 70). 
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standing therefore appears to still require that the plaintiff demonstrate a specific 
interest, and cannot be said to allow general public interest standing. 
Some commentators have argued that Australian standing law is far more   
flexible than standing law in the United States.220  However, such a position has 
never been adopted by the High Court.  While the Australian High Court is not 
operating under the same constitutional constraint as the U.S. Supreme Court, both 
courts currently show a great reluctance to expand standing in the absence of    
congressional mandates.  This reluctance demonstrates the extent to which both 
Courts are very protective of the resources of the court system. Neither the       
Australian nor American Courts currently allow a significant expansion of standing 
to challenge administrative grievances. 
4. Administrative Standing Conclusion 
Both Australia and the United States severely limit the ability of plaintiffs to 
obtain third party standing to challenge administrative actions.  The United States, 
however, previously embraced broad administrative standing, a likely consequence 
of the prior expansion in standing in rights cases.  Canada, like the United States, 
broadened public interest standing in administrative cases after expanding the   
doctrine in rights cases, but unlike the United States it has retained this expanded 
standing, perhaps because it relies on the same basis as standing in rights cases, 
rather than the more tenuous issue-specific approach used in the United States.  
Third party standing in administrative cases presents many of the same issues as 
third party standing in rights cases, and it is not surprising that Canada has chosen 
to analyze both types of cases using the same test.  Both cases rely on an individual 
to protect the rights of others. However, a different situation arises when an      
organization brings suit on behalf of its members.  In Canada and Australia, the 
cases are analyzed using the standing tests developed in individual cases.  In the 
United States, however, where courts protect rights and yet strongly limit standing 
in third party cases, association standing has evolved as a stop gap measure for 
many of these cases. 
B. Association Standing 
Association standing is the term used in the United States when an association 
(or other organization) brings suit on behalf of one or more of its members.221  In 
association standing cases, there is generally no reason an individual member of 
the association could not bring suit, even together with the association, because 
only one plaintiff in a case is required to demonstrate standing.  This is frequently 
 ________________________  
 220. See Carl Bruch, Constitutional Environmental Law: Giving Force to Fundamental Principles in Africa, 
26 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 131, 211 (2001); David Krinsky, How to Sue Without Standing: The Constitutionality of 
Citizen Suits in Non-Article III Tribunals, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV 301, 331 (2007). 
 221. International Union, United Auto. Workers v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274, 276-77 (1986).  The standing of the 
association is not at issue if the association itself can demonstrate injury and qualify for direct standing, and the 
term association standing, as it is used here, does not apply to such cases.   
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not done, however, and association standing, which exists as a settled doctrine only 
in the United States, allows the association to bring suit in place of one or more of 
its members.  This happens even when the members individually would have no 
impediment to suit.222  In contrast, when an association brings suit in both Canada 
and Australia, each case is analyzed relying on ordinary standing requirements.  
Association standing likely developed in the United States due to a combination of 
rigid standing rules and an acceptance of the increased quality of representation in 
suits brought by associations. 
1. Association Standing in the United States 
Association standing allows an association to sue as long as it can demonstrate 
that at least one of its members has standing.223  The history of this doctrine was 
traced by the Supreme Court in United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 
751 v. Brown Group.224  Hints of it first emerged in 1958, in NAACP v. Ala. ex rel. 
Patterson, when the Court declared that the association “and its members are in 
every practical sense identical.”225  However, NAACP was complicated because the 
association sought to challenge a requirement that it release its membership lists.226  
Therefore, while the Court did hold that the association had a sufficient nexus with 
its members to allow it to act as their representative, the Court also noted that the 
association itself faced harm from the same challenged conduct.227  While this fact 
was simply noted as “a further factor pointing towards our holding that petitioner 
has standing,” the case left courts unclear how to separate the interests of the  
members of an association from those of the association itself, as well as whether 
the members’ interests were required to relate directly to their ties to the            
association.228 
Modern association standing emerged through three cases: Warth v. Seldin;229 
Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission;230 and International  
Union, United Automobile, Aerospace, & Agricultural Implement Workers of 
America v. Brock.231 
In 1975, Warth v. Seldin, the first of the three cases, established that an         
association could qualify for standing by showing that at least one of its members 
had suffered an injury sufficient to confer Article III standing, and that the personal 
presence in the case of the individual members with standing was not necessary to 
 ________________________  
 222. In this sense, it contradicts Fallon’s rule that when suit is brought on behalf of a specific person that 
person must have some impediment to bringing suit personally. 
 223. 477 U.S. at 276-77. 
 224. 517 U.S. 544, 551-53 (1996). 
 225. 357 U.S. 449, 459  (1958). 
 226. Id. at 458. 
 227. Id. at 458-60 (noting the association could expect ever decreasing membership rolls as a consequence 
of the membership disclosure requirement). 
 228. Id. at 460. 
 229. 422 U.S. 490 (1975). 
 230. 432 U.S. 333 (1977). 
 231. 477 U.S. 274 (1986). 
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resolve the issue.232 However, in that case, the association, Metro-Act of       
Rochester, was unable to demonstrate that a member of the organization had  
standing and therefore was not granted standing.233  Metro-Act was a non-profit 
organization operating in the Rochester, New York area, committed to increasing 
housing for low and moderate income residents.234  It brought suit challenging a 
1962 zoning ordinance that allocated ninety-eight percent of the vacant land in 
Penfield to single family housing, and required conditions that would put these 
homes out of reach of low income residents.235   
Metro-Act argued that it should receive association standing because nine   
percent of its members lived in Penfield.236  These members were alleged to have 
suffered harm under the 1968 Civil Rights Act because the zoning policies of the 
town, which discriminated against low income residents, had a disproportionate 
effect on the exclusion of racial minorities.237  This, in turn, resulted in the Penfield 
residents living in a less diverse town.238  This indirect harm, that a rule intended to 
restrict low (and moderate) income residents effectively excluded members of  
minority racial groups, was held to be too tenuous to maintain standing for any of 
the Penfield residents.239  As the association had failed to show that at least one of 
its members had standing, the association itself could not demonstrate standing.240 
The association standing requirements were further clarified two years later, in 
Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission.241  The case was brought 
over a North Carolina requirement that all apples shipped into the state identify the 
grade of apples using only federal standards or state that no grading standard had 
been used.242  Compliance with the North Carolina requirement necessitated either 
separate boxes for all apples shipped to North Carolina, or a covering for the 
Washington grades, giving the apples a damaged appearance.243 
The Court summarized prior case law as requiring an association to           
demonstrate that “(a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their 
own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s 
 ________________________  
 232. 422 U.S. at 512. 
 233. Id. at 512-14. 
 234. Id. at 494. 
 235. Id. at 495.  These conditions included required minimum setbacks, floor space, and lot space.  Id.  Even 
the small percentage of multifamily housing was alleged to be out of reach for low income residents due to density 
requirements.  Id.  
 236. Id. at 512.  Metro-Act made both individual and association arguments regarding standing.  Id.  While 
neither type was ultimately successful, only the association standing arguments are relevant to this discussion.  Id.  
 237. Id. at 514 n.21. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id.  The Court noted, however, that it was specifically deciding only the argument it understood the 
association to be making, that the zoning was intended to exclude low and moderate income residents, and that the 
outcome could have been different had the zoning instead been shown as an attempt to directly exclude minority 
residents.  Id.  
 240. Id.  The Court also noted that, even were harm demonstrated under these circumstances, prudential 
consideration could hold against granting the association or its members standing, because it was unclear that the 
interests of the excluded minorities in court would best be served by Metro-Act or one of its members.  Id. at 514. 
 241. 432 U.S. 333 (1977). 
 242. Id. at 337.  State grading systems, like the one in Washington that was alleged to be superior to the 
federal system in all respects, were explicitly not allowed.  Id.  
 243. Id. at 338.   
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purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the  
participation of individual members in the lawsuit.”244  Given that the regulation 
placed increased costs on Washington apple growers, the interest of the         
Commission in protecting Washington apple growers aligned with the focus of the 
case, and no individual proof was required, the association standing requirements 
were met.245 
The final association standing case did not occur until 1986, when the            
International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural Implement 
Workers of America challenged regulations issued by the Secretary of Labor under 
the Trade Act of 1974, which provided “benefits to workers laid off because of 
competition from imports.”246  The Court reiterated the association standing rule as 
announced in Hunt, and held that the workers had an injury sufficient to confer 
standing on the association.247  This was despite the fact that all individual claims 
were required to be adjudicated in state court, as standing could be granted to   
anyone to challenge the validity of federal regulations in federal court, even if the 
results reached under those regulations were relegated to state courts.248 
The case did little to clarify association standing, but is important because it 
reiterated the firm support of the Court for the doctrine. The Secretary had        
challenged not only whether the union met the requirements of the association 
standing test, but also whether association standing should be abandoned in favor 
of class actions.249  The Secretary argued that class actions were superior to       
association standing cases in protecting the interests of the plaintiffs.250  The main 
basis for this argument was that a court is required to ensure that the class         
representative will properly represent the interests of the class, while no such    
explicit test is required in association standing.251 
 ________________________  
 244. Id. at 343. 
 245. Id. at 344.  In fact, the Court acknowledged that under these standards the case was straightforward 
except that it was not immediately clear that the Washington State Apple Advertising Commission should qualify 
as an association.  Id.  The Commission was not a voluntary organization but a state agency, supported by dues 
required of all apple growers in Washington.  Id. at 337.  Despite this fact, the Court found the Commission  
sufficiently similar to a traditional association to grant standing.   Id. at 344.  Of importance to this finding, the 
Commission was composed entirely of apple growers, was governed entirely by apple growers, and was financed 
entirely by apple growers, including the costs of the lawsuit. Id.  The Court was therefore willing to equate the 
Commission with a traditional trade organization.  Id. While the Court also noted that the Commission itself might 
be considered to have suffered harm, as its fees were dependant on the number of apples sold as “Washington 
apples” and if the North Carolina requirement resulted in a decrease in the number of apples sold, the fees     
obtained by the Commission would also decrease.  Id. at 345.  The Court continued saying “[t]his financial nexus 
between the interests of the Commission and its constituents coalesces with the other factors noted above to assure 
that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for 
illumination of difficult constitutional questions,” and standing was explicitly granted as association standing, not 
standing due to any direct injury suffered by the Commission.  Id. 
 246. 477 U.S. 274, 276-77 (1986). 
 247. Id. at 288. 
 248. Id. at 287-88. 
 249. Id. at 288-89. 
 250. Id. 
 251. Id.  The Secretary also put forth other concerns including that the association “might lack resources or 
experience or might bring lawsuits without authorization from its membership.  In addition, the litigation strategy 
selected by the association might reflect the views of only a bare majority -- or even an influential minority -- of 
the full membership.”  Id. at 289. 
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While the Court noted that association standing was not perfect, it felt that any 
problems were more than made up for by the benefits of association standing.252  
“While a class action creates an ad hoc union of injured plaintiffs who may be 
linked only by their common claims, an association suing to vindicate the interests 
of its members can draw upon a pre-existing reservoir of expertise and capital.”253  
The Court also noted that the ability to bring association suits was one of the major 
benefits of belonging to an organization: “‘The only practical judicial policy when 
people pool their capital, their interests, or their activities under a name and form 
that will identify collective interests, often is to permit the association or           
corporation in a single case to vindicate the interests of all.’”254 
The Court did express concern about protecting individual members from harm 
caused by association standing, noting that, were a judgment that could be shown 
to have been deficient obtained against an agency, further claims by individual 
association members might not be precluded “without offending due process    
principles.”255  The Court also noted that, were such issues brought to the attention 
of the court while the association was still a party, the court might be forced to find 
a solution.256  Notably, however, the Court did not add an additional prong to the 
association standing test requiring a showing that the action was supported by a 
majority of the members of the association or that the association had sufficient 
funds to see the case through.257  The Court did note, however, that no such specific 
allegations had been made regarding the union at issue.258 
While the benefits listed by the Court are no doubt true, they do not fully     
explain why association standing should exist.  One potential explanation is that 
such cases present an effective way of performing more abstract review.  As in the 
Washington State apple case, enough facts still remain that the Court was not    
required to see the issue as an abstract facial challenge, but removing the individual 
and corresponding individual facts allowed the Court to better understand the 
broader issue, that the statute had been enacted to prevent Washington apples from 
being sold in North Carolina, without having to delve into the details of a particular 
Washington grower.  It was also a level of abstraction that made it easier to find the 
statute invalid, and to do so on behalf of the large number of growers affected by 
the statute.  However, despite the benefits noted by the Court, as well as the    
moderately abstract level of review made possible, American style association 
standing is a uniquely American phenomenon, and is not seen in either Canada or 
Australia.  
 ________________________  
 252. Id.  
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. at 290 (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 187 (1951)  
(Jackson, J., concurring). 
 255. Id.  
 256. Id.  
 257. Id.  
 258. Id.  
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2. Association Standing in Canada 
In Canada, as in the United States, an association can sue directly if it can 
demonstrate a direct interest in the case. However, an association does not        
necessarily have standing if it can  demonstrate that a member has standing.  The 
issue has not been addressed by the Supreme Court, and lower court opinions   
appear on both sides.  The Supreme Court has not needed to address it because 
many of the cases in which an association brings suit qualify for public interest 
standing.  It therefore appears that public interest standing, which was discussed in 
Part II.B.1, has subsumed at least part of the void filled by association standing in 
the United States. 
The current uncertain state of association standing in Canada is demonstrated 
by Canadian Generic Pharmaceutical Association v. Canada, a federal trial court 
case.259  In this case, the court discussed both sides of the association standing  
argument before avoiding the issue and deciding to allow standing under the public 
interest standing exception.260  The court cited only federal cases when discussing 
why an association could not obtain standing based simply on the standing of a 
member, but it included provincial cases on the opposite side, evidently swayed at 
least somewhat by the association’s argument that the cases showed the “winds of 
change are blowing.”261 
The first case cited to describe why an association cannot obtain standing 
based solely on the standing of a member was Independent Contractors & Business 
Ass’n v. Canada (Minister of Labour), a federal appellate case.262  The association, 
a group of non-unionized shop contractors, and some individual members of the 
association brought suit challenging regulations establishing the minimum wage 
rate for qualifying projects in British Columbia.263 It was established that the     
individual contractors had previously bid on such projects, and intended to do so in 
the future, which was sufficient to confer standing.264 However, despite this      
decision, the court also held that the association did not have standing.265  This was 
because the association “is not itself in the construction business and is therefore in 
no position to bid on federal government contracts in British Columbia.”266  The 
association was therefore not directly affected by the action or departmental      
decisions relating to the action.267  While the association had sought review of the 
 ________________________  
 259. [2007] F.C. No. 202 (Can.). 
 260. Id. ¶¶ 9-20. 
 261. Id. ¶ 15. 
 262. 1998 N.R. LEXIS 112 (Can. F.C.A. 1998). 
 263. Id. ¶¶ 5-6. 
 264. Id. ¶¶ 13-14.   
 265. Id. ¶ 30.  The association’s standing appears to have been addressed, despite having already determined 
that at least one petitioner had standing, because the association sought leave to file a response to the             
administrative decision.  Id. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. 
39
: Third Party Standing
Published by Digital Commons @ Barry Law, 2011
154 Barry Law Review Vol. 16 
 
decision, the court felt that the association’s true interests were “‘merely indirect or 
contingent.’”268   
In contrast, in Alberta Liquor Store Ass’n v. Alberta (Gaming and Liquor 
Commission),269 an Alberta trial court granted standing to an association without 
demanding that the association demonstrate independent injury.270  At issue was an 
administrative decision to grant liquor licenses to companies with connections to 
large grocery store chains.271  This decision was challenged by independent liquor 
stores as well as an association of independent liquor stores that did not itself    
operate any stores.272 Again the issue for the association was whether it could  
qualify for standing even though it could not demonstrate any individual harm.273  
After acknowledging that case law seemed to go against granting standing in such 
a situation, the court nevertheless granted it, noting: 
The refusal of the court to recognize the standing of collective    
organizations, on the basis that only the members of the              
organization are “aggrieved”, is somewhat formalistic.  The courts 
increasingly recognize the validity, and indeed the desirability, of 
collective action. The law recognizes the legitimacy of a number of 
entrepreneurs combining their resources to carry on a business.  
There is no reason why the court should refuse to recognize the  
legitimacy of a number of aggrieved citizens combining together to 
form a collective entity to advance their grievances. In more recent 
years, standing has been granted to a number of these                 
organizations, often the “Friends of” something, or the “Concerned 
Citizens” of some type, even if the association was formed solely 
to engage the particular issue before the tribunal.  The granting of 
standing to collective organizations avoids multiplicity of lawsuits.  
It allows a number of concerned persons to combine their            
resources, which leads to a better ability to marshal evidence, to  
retain counsel, and generally to provide the kind of input that leads 
to sound decisions by administrative tribunals and the courts.  
There is therefore no reason to refuse standing to a society like the 
Alberta Liquor Store Association, particularly where that           
Association is a long-standing representative of members of the 
industry, and can be expected to have the expertise and resources 
 ________________________  
 268. Id. ¶ 31 (citing Canadian Transit Co. v. Public Service Relations Board (Can.), [1989] 3 F.C. 611, 614 
(Can. Fed. App. Ct.).  In this case, review was sought on a statutory basis, but there is no reason to believe the 
“directly affected” requirement of the Federal Courts Act would narrow the traditional standing rules. 
 269. [2006] A.R.J. No. 1597 (Alberta Ct. Queen’s Bench). 
 270. Id. ¶ 24. 
 271. Id. ¶ 4 (as well as other unrelated businesses). 
 272. Id. ¶ 6. 
 273. Id. ¶¶ 16-18.  The economic harm suffered by independent stores was found sufficient to provide 
standing for them.  Id. 
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to mount a responsible challenge to the questioned administrative 
acts.274 
While the federal law in Canada still appears to prohibit the broad type of     
association standing currently seen in the United States, at least in federal court, 
there is some hint that this could change in the future.  However, massive change is 
unlikely because public interest standing solves many of the close cases that would 
otherwise push the judiciary to expand the current standing limits for associations.  
The abstract review available through public interest standing also lessens the need 
for courts to resort to association standing to add a layer of abstraction to a case. 
3. Association Standing in Australia 
Australia, like Canada, does not have the doctrinally defined association   
standing seen in the United States.  However, because Australia also does not have 
the liberal public interest standing that Canada has, it has been forced to confront 
the issue of association standing on a more frequent basis.  However, while the 
issue has arisen in multiple cases, Australian courts have yet to issue a definitive 
statement. Association standing has never been addressed in the High Court,     
although at least one lower court incorrectly believed that it had been. 
The High Court failed to address the issue in 1995, in Shop Distributive &    
Allied Employees Ass’n v. Minister for Industrial Affairs.275  In this case, a union 
sought to protest a decision by the Minister for Industrial Affairs establishing    
limited trading hours on Sundays in stores that had previously been closed.276  The 
decision had been made under a law granting the Minister authority to determine 
what hours shops were permitted to be open, including whether Sunday openings 
were permitted.277  Such a change was permitted on a permanent basis after the 
Minister had ascertained that a majority of “interested persons” desired the change, 
but could be made on a limited basis unilaterally, as long as the change did not last 
more than a month.278  The union brought suit alleging that the Minister lacked the 
authority to set hours that had not been fixed by the legislature.279  The union 
members included shop assistants in the affected areas.280 However, while      
standing was challenged in the case, the Minister did not contest that the interests 
of the union mirrored that of its members.281  The Court had no difficulty finding 
that the shop assistants had a greater than average interest in the hours the stores 
they worked in were open.282  As the Court itself chose not to address the standing 
of the union as distinct from its members, the union’s standing was not directly at 
 ________________________  
 274. Id. ¶ 20, 24. 
 275. (1995) 129 A.L.R. 191 (Austl.). 
 276. Id.  
 277. Id.  
 278. Id.  
 279. Id.  
 280. Id.  
 281. Id.  
 282. Id.  
41
: Third Party Standing
Published by Digital Commons @ Barry Law, 2011
156 Barry Law Review Vol. 16 
 
issue.283  This cannot be considered sufficient to establish association standing in 
Australia. 
Association standing should have been addressed anew in 2001 in the lower 
court case ofNorth Australian Aboriginal Legal Aid Service Inc v. Bradley.284  The 
case was brought by an aboriginal legal aid association to protest the allegedly 
invalid appointment of a new Chief Magistrate for the Northern Territory.285  In an 
attempt to demonstrate a special interest and thereby secure standing, the          
association stated that it had represented a number of aboriginal defendants, many 
of whom had previously come before the newly appointed Chief Magistrate prior 
to his elevation.286  The Northern Territory disputed that anyone other than the  
individual coming before the magistrate could have a special interest in the matter 
and that the association’s interest was instead “an ‘intellectual or emotional’     
concern.”287  The court said that the starting point for an association standing   
analysis was to determine the association’s “status and the functions which it    
performs.”288  The association received public funding to allow it to carry out its 
mission, and it existed entirely to provide legal assistance to some of the most   
disadvantaged members of the community.289  Commenting that the association 
had “the same interest in the matter as would any of its members,” the court 
granted standing to the association.290  However, even though the court individually 
analyzed whether association standing could be granted based on the interests of 
the members, the court erroneously cited Shop Distributive & Allied Employees 
Ass’n as holding that the interests of an association included those of its          
members.291 
Had the case been brought in the U.S., many of the same concerns would have 
been addressed (would a member of the association have standing292 and does the 
association have an interest in the subject matter at issue).  However, the Australian 
court did not address whether it was necessary for the complaint of an individual 
member to be heard—a necessary component of association standing in the United 
States.  It is therefore possible that a form of association standing is evolving in 
Australia, but if this is the case, it does not yet have the formal structure seen in the 
United States and cannot be used reliably in place of individual standing.  This 
situation will continue until the High Court confronts the issue directly. 
 ________________________  
 283. Id.  
 284. (2001) 192 A.L.R. 625 (Austl.). 
 285. Id.  
 286. Id.  
 287. Id.  
 288. Id.  
 289. Id.  
 290. Id.   
 291. Id.  It is questionable, therefore, why it still completed the full analysis.   
 292. With member being defined in this case to include customer or person for whom the agency advocates. 
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4. Association Standing Conclusion 
The United States is the only one of the three countries with an established 
doctrine of association standing.  Such a result could be considered surprising, as 
the United States has such a strong insistence on individually demonstrated injury.  
This could be an attempt by American courts to seek a more abstract form of    
review or could simply be a result of the larger case volume present in the United 
States and the harmless injury caused when an association represents a member 
who would otherwise unquestionably have standing.  It is also understandable that 
a similar doctrine has not evolved in Canada, as public interest standing covers 
many of the situations in which association standing is used in the United States.  
Australia, however, has neither Canada’s broad public interest standing nor the 
rigidly defined association standing of the United States.  This cannot simply be 
explained by a comparative lack of cases, as the opportunity has arisen to address 
the issue in Australia.  However, it does demonstrate the extent to which standing 
exceptions for rights allow other exceptions to follow.  Association standing has 
not been addressed in Australia because the High Court has yet to confront a     
necessary exception, particularly in a case implicating rights.  Cases in which it 
could be at issue have also been brought by individuals with standing.  Association 
standing has therefore never been critical to addressing the case the way the issue 
arises in rights cases.  The U.S. and Canada have both created a number of        
exceptions to traditional standing.  The two approaches are not equal, however, as 
the next section explains. 
IV. DISCUSSION—PROBLEMS WITH THE UNITED STATES’ APPROACH TO 
STANDING IN RIGHTS CASES 
To this point, this article has described how American and Canadian courts 
used different methods to ensure cases vindicating certain rights could be brought 
in court, despite failing to meet traditional standing requirements. It has also     
discussed the effects of the different methods chosen to achieve this goal.  The 
article will now detail why these two methods, the Canadian and American       
approaches, should not be considered equally valid methods of rights vindication.  
An issue by issue approach, like that used in the United States, would not          
necessarily compare less favorably to the broad general approach adopted by the 
Canadian court.  However, the particular approach used by the U.S. Supreme Court 
has generally failed to acknowledge and accept the problems inherent in traditional 
standing.  While the Court at least acknowledged that traditional standing was still 
at issue in taxpayer standing, by combining standing with the merits in overbreadth 
it has essentially just created a secret backdoor entrance to the Court that it now 
zealously guards.  Expanded standing in the cases currently analyzed using     
overbreadth is necessary to protect rights, but by not acknowledging the conflict 
this creates with the Case or Controversy Clause, the Court has failed to fully step 
up to its role as the final rights protector in American society.  Free speech rights 
are preserved, but many others are not. There has also never been a good           
explanation given as to why constitutional constraints can be ignored in certain 
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areas.  To the extent the Court is holding this door open in taxpayer standing, it is 
trying to hold it open by only one inch.  This is an untenable position over the long 
term.  That exceptions exist at all in the American system is evidence that the 
American constitutional constraints cannot be absolutes, particularly when        
confronted by other constitutional requirements.293 
American courts claim to be shackled by the Constitution when addressing 
rights cases in which explicit exceptions have not already been created.  Whatever 
role the Constitution may play when determining how American courts should 
approach administrative challenges, whether because of the Case or Controversy 
Clause or the notion of separated powers, cases brought to determine rights must be 
able to sidestep constitutional shackles.294  A case brought to vindicate a right, 
whether the right is personal or shared by society, is inherently different than a 
dispute between two private parties over a contract.  Constraints created to limit the 
latter should hold far less sway when rights are at issue, particularly when the 
rights did not even exist when the Case or Controversy Clause was adopted. 
Rights enshrined in the Constitution have no less authority of law than the Case 
or Controversy Clause.  With the decision in Marbury v. Madison295 should have 
come a realization that courts are the ultimate protectors of the rights so recently 
enshrined in the Bill of Rights, and that access to the courts must be ensured to 
maintain this judicial oversight.  This result is only heightened by the fact that the 
rights protected in the Bill of Rights came later in time than the Case or            
Controversy Clause, and would therefore ordinarily be assumed to trump based on 
traditional canons of interpretation, whether of law or contract.  To the extent that 
the Constitution can be considered a contract between the government and the 
American people, the people must be allowed to vindicate their promised rights, 
and this should include access to the courthouse when necessary to protect these 
rights. 
Little could be more effective at insulating the workings of government from 
the people than to completely bar access to the courthouse.  Violations that cannot 
be challenged cannot be corrected, and the most effective way for the government 
to win a case is to prevent the case from being heard at all. 
The American and Canadian Supreme Courts both already acknowledge that 
traditional standing cannot protect all rights.  An injury is created in every member 
of the community when the government does not protect rights.  A plaintiff should 
 ________________________  
 293. It is no response to point out that the exceptions are necessary because otherwise the right could not be 
protected.  That is the point.  If American courts were truly prohibited from hearing any cases that did not present 
a concrete case or controversy, free speech and abortion statutes would only be able to be challenged through the 
specific factual scenario presented by volunteers willing to face criminal punishment.  That does not make sense in 
those circumstances, just as it does not make sense in other circumstances that a questionable law with the     
possibility of a clear hypothetical plaintiff can only be challenged by those willing to face criminal prosecution.  
Free speech may be central to our society, but so is due process. 
 294. Although I believe administrative cases also require greater standing, I believe broader standing in 
administrative cases would likely be embraced were the Supreme Court more open about the limitations of the 
Case or Controversy Clause to preventing unchecked abuse by the government. 
 295. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
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not need to prove the rarity of the injury in order to gain courthouse access in rights 
protecting cases.  Broad injuries should not be able to go unchallenged. 
Broader court access in rights cases would not necessarily result in more cases.  
The safeguards employed by Canada, and proposed in Australia, could also be used 
to ensure that wider courtroom access did not result in a deluge of cases—as could 
case consolidation and class action lawsuits.  The real change, however, would be 
the true acceptance of the fact that American courts are the final rights protectors, 
and the decision to act in accordance with this realization. The notion of            
parliamentary supremacy is fading in many parts of the former British Empire.  
With this comes an acknowledgment that courts must take the place of the        
legislative bodies as the guardians of rights.  Such a change can be seen in the two 
Canadian abortion cases.  Before the Constitution was enacted, the Canadian    
Supreme Court shied away from abortion determinations, something it could no 
longer do once parliamentary supremacy had crumbled. 
In contrast, American courts effectively elevate Congress to a position of     
legislative supremacy when they refuse to hear rights cases.  Separation of powers 
issues are better addressed openly, once a case has reached the courtroom. 
CONCLUSION 
A common law system, whether parliamentary or presidential, cannot function 
as the final arbiter of rights under the traditional restrictive concept of standing.  In 
recognition of this fact, both Canada and the United States have expanded their 
traditional standing requirements to allow broader standing in certain rights cases.  
Australia, in contrast, does not face the same rights issues and has not expanded 
standing.  In Canada, a wide variety of rights can be vindicated through third party 
standing, provided the plaintiff is able to convince the court that the case at issue is 
a public interest case.  In contrast, third party standing exceptions in the United 
States are comparatively rare and are specifically carved out for particular rights.  
The method chosen by a country to expand rights protection is important not only 
for rights cases, but for administrative cases as well, as the choices courts must 
make when confronting rights open the door for other types of standing             
expansions. 
The broad approach used in Canada allowed the Canadian Supreme Court to 
incorporate administrative cases within public interest standing.  In contrast, with 
no general concept to extend, standing in the United States has been fought issue 
by issue in administrative law as well.  However, in administrative law, American 
courts have returned to strictly enforcing the constitutional standing requirements; 
requirements that are explicitly ignored in overbreadth cases and trivialized in  
taxpayer standing cases.  Australian proponents of increased standing have faced a 
different type of problem. With no rights-based exceptions to fall back on,        
Australian courts have no precedent for expanded standing, and have not yet     
expanded standing to include administrative complaints.  Changes in Australia will 
therefore likely need to come from outside the judiciary.  Looking at the other 
countries discussed in this article, the United States would benefit from             
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acknowledging the role of courts in rights protection and correspondingly         
increasing access to courts to ensure that rights can be fully protected. 
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